FBI File Number 66-HQ-16371, Section 1

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

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DATE 01-31-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: March 24, 1949

FROM : MR. V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT: ATOMIC ENERGY ACT — INFORMANTS

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

BACKGROUND:

The Bureau's responsibility in connection with the Atomic Energy Act includes the investigation of applicants for positions with the AEC and the investigation of unauthorized disclosure of restricted data affecting the atomic bomb. While there are no known recent attempts by Soviet and satellite espionage agents to procure information relative to the atomic bomb, it is self-evident that the primary objective of the Soviets is to learn the "know how" and latest developments regarding the bomb.

Action by Bureau Regarding Coverage of Possible Violations of the Atomic Energy Act 14

Manifestly, the Bureau's objective in detecting and investigating attempts to obtain restricted data is most readily accomplishable through the use of confidential informants. Since the inception of the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction under the Atomic Energy Act, the development of confidential informants has been of serious concern. The field has been instructed to institute a continuing project to develop informants in important vital installations. Bureau Bulletins 12 and 34 dated February 26, 1947, and June 12, 1948, as well as SAC Letter No. 59, dated May 16, 1947, have been transmitted to the field instructing them in this regard. As a result thereof, one Communist informant is being utilized by Seattle and Los Angeles is presently in the process of promoting an informant into a position where he possibly can become a productive informant regarding atomic energy matters. Additionally, the offices covering the principal installations, namely, El Paso, Seattle, Knoxville, New York, Albany, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, were instructed on March 2, 1949, to make every effort to promote some present Communist informant into a position with the AEC whereby he could become a valuable informant regarding atomic energy matters.

To further dischargeour responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act, the following additional steps have been taken:

1. A program was inaugurated with regard to twelve vital installations whereby the Bureau would maintain close liaison with law enforcement agencies in the area surrounding each of the vital installations. Liaison was also established with the appropriate military authorities stationed in the vicinity of each vital installation.

2. A similar program was effectuated with regard to certain "Class A Facilities," so designated by the AEC.

3. A detailed review is made of applicant investigations wherein subversive derogatory information is developed. In certain of these cases additional

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9 Undercover Assignments in Atomic Energy Installations

internal security investigation is conducted and arrangements are made with the AEC to be advised if applicants concerning whom subversive derogatory information is discovered are cleared for access to restricted data. If such applicants are cleared by the AEC, the Bureau arranges to afford these individuals additional coverage.

4. The Supervisors in the Atomic Energy Section are constantly on the alert to the possibility of discovering some individual that may possibly be utilized as an informant by the field in connection with atomic energy matters.

Possibility of Establishing Bureau Agents in Undercover Capacities in 3 Major Atomic Energy Installations

Both the advisability and feasibility of placing Bureau Agents in vital installations in undercover capacities have been considered. In consideration of this possibility, certain problems are posed in the outset. To insure an adequate cover for Agents selected, it is believed that they must have been in the Bureau no longer than one or two years. They should have a background of training and experience that would render them adaptable to the type of work being performed in the vital installations. Naturally, some technical training and/or experience is desirable because the greatest outlet for information relating to the Atomic Energy Program is through scientists, technicians, etc.

Availability of Agents for Such an Assignment

The vocation records maintained by the Administrative Division disclose that there are 72 chemists, 310 physicists, 115 electricians, 105 engineers, 12 biologists, 19 mathematicians, and 18 metallurgists among the Special Agents presently in the Bureau. Obviously, many of the Agents allocated to the various technical fields would neither be adaptable nor available for an undercover job. However, it is belived that there are among the group, referred to above, an adequate number of Agents with sufficient technical experience and background to handle such an undercover job.

Manner of Placing Agents in the Vital Installations

There are two readily suggested means of establishing Agents in undercover capacities in vital installations. The first is to have the Agent apply for a position with AEC in a vital installation without disclosing his identity and our purpose to AEC. Second, is to arrange with one top trusted official of AEC, such as Admiral Gingrich, Director of Security and Intelligence, for the placing of Agents in undercover capacities in vital installations. The first method, if possible to accomplish, appears the more desirable.

Possible Objections to Such a Program

It is recognized that this would tie up Bureau personnel for a period of time during which the first year or two must reasonably be expected to be only

slightly productive. Consideration must likewise be afforded to the possibility of the disclosure of Agents in undercover capacities in atomic energy vital installations and the resultant publicity and embarrassment to the Bureau. Of course, our objective in utilizing undercover Agents in vital installations would be to obtain information relative to espionage and sabotage. However, a public disclosure of the program would result in outcries of Gestapo tactics from certain sources and the leveling of accusations that such techniques were being used in connection with the Bureau's investigation of applicants for positions with AEC.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the proposal outlined above be considered and the Bureau take steps to endeavor to place Agents in undercover capacities in the 3 major atomic energy installations located at Los Alamos, New Mexico; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and, Hanford, Washington. In the event that this recommendation is approved, detailed plans for placing the program in operation will be submitted.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

TO : THE DIRECTOR : April 13, 1949

FROM : THE EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: ATOMIC ENERGY ACT - INFORMANTS

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

At the Executive Conference on April 11, 1949, attended by Messrs. Tolson, Clegg, Glavin, Harbo, Nichols, Rosen, Ladd, Mohr, Nease and Fletcher, the matter of informants in Atomic Energy installations was discussed. Under the Atomic Energy Act the Bureau has the responsibility of investigation of applicants for positions with the Atomic Energy Commission and also has the responsibility for the investigation of unauthorized disclosure of restricted data affecting the Atomic Energy Program. In the over-all espionage field it is felt that the Soviet and satellite intelligence services have as one of their primary objectives the matter of atomic energy. The development of confidential informants with reference to the Atomic Energy field has been one of continuing importance, and the field was instructed over two years ago to develop confidential informants. Recently, such offices were instructed to make an effort to promote some Communist into a position with the Atomic Energy Commission, because it was felt that he could be of more assistance to the Bureau, both from the standpoint of subversive coverage and from the standpoint of espionage coverage. Further, in the past, a program was inaugurated with respect to the twelve vital installations of the Atomic Energy Commission so that the Bureau maintains close liaison with law enforcement agencies in the area surrounding each of the vital installations. Liaison is also maintained with appropriate military authorities in the same vicinities. A similar program was effectuated with regard to "Class A" facilities as designated by the Atomic Energy Commission. If, during the course of applicant investigations, subversive, derogatory information is developed and the applicant is still cleared for employment, the Bureau attempts to effect additional coverage of such employees.

Supervisors in the Atomic Energy Section, as well as in the Espionage Section, are constantly alert to discover some individual who might be utilized as an informant.

To further make effective the Bureau's coverage, having in mind that at the present time the Bureau is not in possession of information that there is any current activity on the part of the Soviet and satellite intelligence systems to procure information relative to Atomic Energy, which indicates a gap in the intelligence coverage, it was recommended to the Conference that consideration be given to the placing of a Bureau Agent in each of the three most critical Atomic Energy installations at Hanford, Washington; Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Los Alamos, New Mexico. It was believed that the selected Agent personnel should have had experience for one or two years as Special Agents. They should have the background, training, education and experience which would render them adaptable to the type of work being performed in the indicated installations. They should be rather high placed in these installations in technical or scientific fields, as distinguished from normal trades.

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Memo for Director

The vocation records maintained by the Administrative Division disclose many Agents who are qualified as chemists, physicists, electricians, engineers, biologists, mathematicians and metallurgists. It is believed that from the present personnel of the Bureau three Agents are available with the necessary background. It was recommended that arrangements for their employment be made through some single top trusted official of the Atomic Energy Commission, because if it should become known to the Atomic Energy Commission that a Bureau Agent is working in the installations and the Atomic Energy Commission had no previous information regarding it, it might be harmful to the Bureau and vitally affect the necessary cooperation with the Commission on other matters. It is believed that the Agents selected and assigned should remain on such assignments for at least a year and possibly two years to see whether or not the program is effective.

The Conference was of the unanimous opinion that it was desirable that three Agents be assigned so that they could be employed by the Atomic Energy Commission in the three named critical installations in an effort to promote the Bureau's coverage and to further assure the discharge of the Bureau's obligations.

If you approve, the personnel records will be checked to ascertain those Special Agents best suited for this assignment and detailed procedures to effect the recommendation will be submitted.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

cc - Mr. Clegg
Mr. Mohr

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

TO : MR. D. M. LADD DATE: May 2, 1949

FROM : MR. V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT: ATOMIC ENERGY ACT - INFORMANTS

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Reference is made to the Executive Conference memorandum dated April 13, 1949, approving the recommendation that the Bureau place an Agent undercover in each of the atomic energy installations at Los Alamos, New Mexico; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and Richland, Washington. The Director concurred in the recommendation of the Conference.

The Administrative Division has reviewed the vocation records of Special Agents and furnished a list comprising approximately 150 Agents possessing either training or experience in some technical field. From this list the personnel files of fifteen Agents have been reviewed and the names of six Agents are being set forth below, along with brief descriptive data concerning the Agent.

(1) [redacted] EOD [redacted] Age [redacted] Married with no children. He was assigned to [redacted] when he was transferred to [redacted] where he is presently assigned. His efficiency rating was excellent as of 3-31-49 and his education consisted of a major in chemistry with a minor in mathematics and he has had seven years experience as a chemist. From the efficiency report write-ups it appears that he is mature in appearance, possessed of sound judgment, and has progressed satisfactorily.

(2) [redacted] EOD [redacted] Age [redacted] Married and has one daughter. He was assigned to [redacted] when he was transferred to [redacted] where he is presently assigned. He was rated very good on 2-14-49. A letter of censure was directed to him on 3-21-49 occasioned by loss of his badge. The badge was recovered. He has eleven years experience as an electrical engineer and during the inspection of the [redacted] in April, 1948, he readily admitted to the Inspector that his first love was electrical engineering. This Agent, from the write-ups and photograph, appears very mature and has progressed very well.

(3) [redacted] EOD [redacted] Age [redacted] Married with no children. He was assigned to [redacted] when he was transferred to [redacted] where he is presently assigned. He was rated excellent 2-14-49. The file reflects nothing unfavorable. His education consisted of a major in chemistry with a minor in mathematics. He has had three years experience as a chemist with the [redacted] This Agent has a pleasing mature appearance and, according to the write-ups, possesses reliable and sound judgment.

(4) [redacted] EOD [redacted] Age [redacted] Married with no children. He was assigned to [redacted] when he was transferred to [redacted] where he remains. He has a major in chemistry and a minor in mathematics and his experience consists of analytical work for 2½ years. His file reflects nothing unfavorable and the write-ups indicate that he has lots of enthusiasm and ambition. He presents a very mature appearance.

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Memorandum to Mr. Ladd

(5) ARMAND ANTHONY CAMMAROTA. EOD 4/14/47. Age 32. Single. He was assigned to El Paso from 7/1/47 to 2/15/48 when he was transferred to Washington Field. He remained there until 4/16/48 when he was transferred to New York where he is presently assigned. Although his latest efficiency rating as of 1/31/49 is good, the write-up is very favorable. He has a major in mathematics with a minor in science and has six years experience in calculating engineering.

(6) RICHARD CHARLES FRYE. EOD 1/24/47. Age 27. Single. He was assigned to Knoxville from 4/6/47 to 5/24/48 when he was transferred to New York where he is presently assigned. He was rated very good 2/23/49. The file failed to disclose anything unfavorable. He majored in chemistry and was engaged in inorganic research for 2½ years.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be referred to the Administrative Division for their consideration regarding assignment of the above-listed Agents in an undercover capacity in AEC installations. It is suggested that all six of these Agents be interviewed in order that their availability can be determined and in order that three of the six can be selected for the assignment. It will be noted that three of the Agents are presently in the New York Office, one in the Philadelphia Office, and two in the Washington Field Office. The two in the Washington Field Office can, of course, be called in for interview. It is suggested that Inspector V. P. Keay proceed to New York and Philadelphia for the purpose of interviewing the other four Agents as it will be less expensive than calling the four Agents into Washington. It should be possible to handle these interviews in one day in both of the offices.

After the three Agents are selected for the assignment but prior to making any definite arrangements with them, Commissioner Strauss of the Commission will be contacted on a confidential basis for the purpose of discussing this assignment and securing his assistance.

Mr. Geavin said these men look ok to him. D.M.

I agree D.M. 5/5

OK 5/10

OK.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Fletcher

DATE: July 18, 1949

FROM : V. P. Keay

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

SUBJECT: Atomic Energy Act Informants

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
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Miss Gandy

Reference is made to prior approval for the selection of Bureau Special Agents to work under cover in the three major Atomic Energy plants at Hanford, Washington, Los Alamos, New Mexico, and Oak Ridge Tennessee. [redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

Commissioner Strauss stated that the Special Agents selected could furnish him as a reference and that he thought that it would probably help in their obtaining employment with the private contractors. He requested that we let him meet the Special Agents selected so that he could truthfully say if interviewed as a reference that he knew these persons and could vouch for them. He stated he did not desire to be furnished with any of the details as to how we were going to conduct this operation and that he would not mention it to any of the other Commissioners.

The six Special Agents who were selected as prospects for this assignment were interviewed with the following results:

(1) [redacted] EOD [redacted] He is [redacted] years of age, married, and presently assigned to the [redacted] Office. He majored in chemistry in college and has had 7 years experience as a chemist. His record is satisfactory.

[redacted] on interview, indicated enthusiasm for an undercover assignment. He stated he had no personal problems that would prevent his acceptance of such an assignment. [redacted] home is in [redacted] and the only other city he has worked in is [redacted] He is not acquainted with any AEC personnel. He attended school at [redacted] and [redacted]

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With reference to [redacted] experience, he advised that he was in the Navy from [redacted] During a large part of this

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Mr. Tolson
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Memorandum for Mr. Fletcher

Naval service, he was assigned to the [redacted] New York Naval Shipyard, where he worked as a [redacted] He had been employed in the same capacity at the shipyard prior to his Naval service. He stated that the only probable persons who knew of the fact that he had become employed by the FBI were the Commanding Officer and Personnel Officer at the shipyard, and it was his belief that this situation could be easily taken care of. From June, 1942, to November, 1942, [redacted] was employed by the [redacted] New York, where he had worked on quantitative analysis and physical tests of copper. He also assisted in research and development work. [redacted] stated that he preferred not to be assigned to the far west if it were possible. It would appear from the interview, he would be ideal for assignment at [redacted]

[redacted] makes a mature impression although he has a somewhat youthful appearance. He seems to have a lot of self-confidence and to be intelligent.

(2) [redacted] EOD [redacted] He is [redacted] years of age, is married, and has no children. His wife is employed at the public schools in [redacted] Maryland, and makes $3,500 per year. [redacted] worked in the Chicago F.O. and was transferred to the [redacted], where he is now stationed. [redacted] majored in chemistry in college and did analytical work for 2½ years. He also taught school in [redacted] his chief subject being mathematics.

[redacted] on interview, stated that he believed he could handle an undercover assignment. He said he had no problems except that his wife is presently employed in [redacted] as a teacher at $3,500 per year, but he indicated that he would not desire that the Bureau defer on any assignment due to this employment of his wife.

[redacted] advised that he was with the [redacted] Ohio, as an analytical chemist from September, 1941, to October, 1942, and worked for the same company again from April, 1946, to August, 1947. He was in the Navy as a [redacted] He was a school teacher in Kentucky prior to 1941 and is well acquainted in Tennessee and Kentucky. Therefore, he could not work at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, in an undercover capacity. His permanent home is in Kentucky. He indicated a preference for [redacted]

[redacted] makes an excellent appearance, is mature, and seems to have sufficient initiative to handle such an assignment. However, in view of the availability of others, I would recommend deferring on him at this time in view of the fact that he is settled in [redacted] and his wife is employed in [redacted] He should be kept in mind for future assignments however.

(3) [redacted] EOD [redacted] He is [redacted] years of age, is married, and has one child. His home is in [redacted] He is presently assigned to the [redacted] and has also worked in the [redacted] His service in the Bureau has been satisfactory, but he has been

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Memorandum for Mr. Fletcher

described as a "worry wart" and as being sometimes burdened with details.

On interview, [redacted] advised that he had had extensive experience as an electrical engineer prior to working for the Bureau and that he is still very much interested in electrical engineering. He last worked as an electrical engineer for the [redacted] Virginia, where he was employed about one year. He has had no contact with this Committee since that time and did not think there would be any problem with reference to undercover work. During 1946, he was a designing engineer for the [redacted] He was in the Marine Corps from [redacted] he worked extensively as a student engineer for the [redacted] and also for the [redacted] He is a graduate of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute.

[redacted] was enthusiastic about the possibility of such an assignment, particularly in view of his continued interest in electrical work. He was of the opinion that he would have no difficulty in such an assignment, and he has no personal problems in connection therewith. He stated he had done some atomic energy work while assigned to the [redacted] but did not become well enough acquainted with any AEC personnel to make any difference.

[redacted] seems mature and according to his SAC, he has made progress in overcoming his tendency to worry about details. He makes a satisfactory appearance, but his appearance is more that of an engineer than a Special Agent; therefore, he would be suitable for such an undercover assignment. In view of the fact that he is the only electrical engineer in the group of Agents being considered, I believe he should be selected for an undercover assignment and that he endeavor to procure employment at [redacted]

(4) RICHARD CHARLES FRYE. EOD 1/24/47. He is 27 years of age and single. His home is Philadelphia and he is assigned to the New York Office. He has worked in only one other office, that is, Knoxville. Frye attended St. Joseph's College in Philadelphia, where he majored in chemistry.

On interview, Frye stated that his experience as a research chemist had been at the Frankford Arsenal, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, both as a civilian and while in the Army. His employment was between September, 1944 to January, 1947.

Frye was enthusiastic about the possibility of the assignment and stated he anticipated no difficulty in such an undercover assignment. Frye makes an excellent appearance, seems capable, and is mature. He advised that he had not done much work at Oak Ridge while assigned to the Knoxville Office and was not acquainted with any AEC security officers or other AEC personnel. Frye would appear satisfactory for assignment to the Los Alamos, New Mexico installation.

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Memorandum for Mr. Fletcher

(5) [redacted] EOD [redacted] He is married, has one child born [redacted] and is [redacted] years of age. [redacted] majored in chemistry at [redacted] Maryland, and his experience was at the [redacted] Baltimore. [redacted] has worked in the [redacted] and [redacted] Offices. He is presently assigned to [redacted]

On interview, [redacted] stated that his experience in chemistry at the [redacted] was of a limited type. He stated that there are a great many people in the [redacted] who know that he came to work for the FBI, but that he thought this could be taken care of in connection with an undercover assignment. He is not acquainted with any AEC personnel, but he noted that he has relatives near El Paso, Texas, which might preclude his assignment to Los Alamos, New Mexico. In view of his limited experience, it is believed that [redacted] should not be assigned in an undercover capacity at this time.

(6) ARMAND ANTHONY CAMMAROTA. EOD Bureau 4/14/47. He is 32 years of age and single. His home is in New York State. He has worked in the El Paso and New York Offices and is now assigned to New York. Cammarota's mother, who lives in Schenectady, New York, is ill with an incurable disease and her death seems to be a matter of time. He was actually transferred to the New York Office to be closer to his mother. Cammarota majored in mathematics at Union College, Schenectady, New York, and had about 3 years experience as a calculating engineer.

On interview, Cammarota stated that he had been giving some thought himself to utilizing his experience in an undercover capacity for the Bureau. He stated that he had worked intermittently for the General Electric Company as a clerk from 1933 to 1934, but that his experience as a calculating engineer was with the American Locomotive Company, Schenectady, New York, where he was employed from 1941 to 1945 and again in September, 1946, to April, 1947. He advised there would be no particular problem in connection with this employment insofar as undercover work is concerned. He appeared enthusiastic about the possibility of such an assignment, but pointed out that he would like it to be deferred pending the resolving of his mother's condition.

Cammarota is somewhat young looking, but is mature, and it is believed he would be satisfactory for an undercover assignment. It is suggested, however, that no further consideration be given to him at this time in view of his mother's condition.

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) It is recommended that the following Special Agents be designated for undercover assignments at the places indicated:

[redacted]

Richard Charles Frye - Los Alamos, New Mexico

(2) It is recommended that consideration be given at a later date to the assignment of an Agent in an undercover capacity to the Bendix Plant in Kansas City pending our experience in connection with the assignment of the Agents to the 3 main installations.

(3) It is recommended that these 3 Agents be called to Washington for final arrangements as to finances, methods of applying for work, etc. Also while in Washington they should be introduced to Commissioner Strauss in view of his request.

(4) It is recommended that after completing arrangements, these Agents take steps to apply for positions in these various installations and if accepted, they immediately initiate their undercover assignments.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: July 20, 1949

FROM : F. R. GLAVIN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

SUBJECT: Atomic Energy Act, Informants

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Reference is made to Mr. Keay's memorandum to Mr. Fletcher, dated July 18, 1949, which is attached hereto, concerning informants under the Atomic Energy Act, wherein it is recommended that Special [redacted] and Richard Charles Frye be considered for assignments at [redacted] Los Alamos.

There are also attached hereto briefs of the files and the files of these Agents. There does not appear to be any question whatsoever concerning [redacted] and Frye, however, in connection with [redacted] who undoubtedly is a good electrical engineer, I wish to point out that SAC Boardman on February 14, 1949, while rating this Agent Very Good, stated that [redacted] had a pleasant, friendly personality; was inclined to be a "worry wart"; he was slow, methodical and at times indecisive and he paid close attention to detail, some of which was not always pertinent. He got along well with his fellow employees and was possessed of average force and aggressiveness. SAC Boardman further stated in this efficiency report that except for a tendency at times not to be sure of himself, he gave evidence of being a very good investigator and that his progress had been very satisfactory and he believed [redacted] would continue to develop with added experience. In a letter dated March 21, 1949 this Agent was censured for the loss of his badge, which was subsequently turned in to the [redacted] Office by a policeman and he was advised at that time that it would be necessary for him to exercise the utmost care in the future to prevent a further loss of any Bureau property in his custody. It is thought that these comments should be borne in mind in connection with his suggested undercover assignment.

With reference to the method of financing these Agents insofar salary is concerned, they could be retained on the Bureau's rolls and appropriate arrangements could be made by them for the Bureau to deposit their checks in a bank of their own choosing. If, as I understand it, they are paid by a civilian contractor working for the Atomic Energy Commission, they could receive their salary checks direct from the civilian contractor and any salary payments in excess of actual expenses to these men could be turned in to the Bureau or the respective SAC's by cashiers' checks and deposited in the Treasury's miscellaneous receipts. As I understand it from

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON

Mr. Fletcher, these men would be paid by a civilian contractor, there would be no duplication of government payment and we would not have to take them off the Bureau's rolls.

Files and Briefs Attached.

WRG:amb

CC-247

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

July 21, 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

Re: Atomic Energy Act
Informants

In connection with the selection of personnel for undercover assignment in the three principal Atomic Energy installations, Agent [redacted] has informed me that careful consideration was afforded to the selection of single Agents. It was felt that little difficulty and Bureau expense would be encountered by placing single Agents in such assignments. Of the group of Agents potentially eligible for such assignment, six were selected as most adaptable for the assignment. Two of these were single; two were married with no children; and the remaining two were married with one child each. Of the three Agents finally selected for the assignments, one is single, one is married with no children, and one is married with one child.

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It is believed, taking all factors into consideration, that these three Agents represent the best possible choices.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

Respectfully,

H. B. Fletcher

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166-16371-5

3 OCT 28 1949

THIS MEMORANDUM IS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES
TO BE DESTROYED AFTER ACTION IS TAKEN AND NOT SENT TO FILES

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

TO : MR. FLETCHER HBF

FROM : V. P. KEAY VPK

July 27, 1949

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: ATOMIC ENERGY ACT - INFORMANTS

BACKGROUND:

You will recall from the previous memoranda in connection with the above-captioned matter that the Executive Conference approved the recommendation that three Special Agents possessing technical experience and/or training be placed in the three Atomic Energy installations, namely, Los Alamos, New Mexico, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Hanford, Washington.

After a review of the vocation records and personnel files of various Agents, six were selected as representing the best possible choices for this assignment. These were [redacted] Richard Charles Frye, [redacted] and Armand Anthony Cammarota.

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I interviewed these six Agents and recommended that [redacted] and Frye be designated for undercover assignments at [redacted] and Los Alamos, respectively. [redacted] is married with no children; [redacted] is married with one child; and Frye is single.

Pursuant to instructions, the vocation records of the Bureau Special Agents have been further examined in an effort to locate three single Agents for undercover assignment.

RESULTS OF REVIEW OF VOCATION RECORDS:

114 Special Agents have indicated that they possess technical experience and/or training, varying in degree from three months' experience as a wheat analyst to fifteen years of electrical engineering experience. In accordance with the prior approved plans, consideration would not be afforded to an Agent for this assignment, if he had been in the Bureau more than two years. It was felt that consideration should not be afforded Agents who have been in the Bureau for more than two years because of the obvious difficulty that would be encountered in fixing a cover for these Agents. Additionally, as reflected in my memorandum of July 18, 1949, I observed from talking to the 6 Agents named above that according to their own statements, their proficiency, of course, declines every year that they are away from their respective technical fields. Accordingly, those Agents who entered the Bureau prior to 1947 were not considered. Of the 114 Agents potentially eligible, 58 entered the Bureau prior to 1947. 21 of these 58 are assigned to the Technical Laboratory.

RECORDED - 111 166-16371-6

Of the remaining 56 Agents indicating experience or training in the technical field, 21 possess experience and/or training that possibly would permit them to secure a position as a technician in some Atomic Energy installation. 19 of these are married. The remaining two who are single are Richard C. Frye, who was recommended by me for the spot at Los Alamos, and Armand Anthony Cammarota, who was interviewed by me. However, it was recommended that since Agent Cammarota's mother is ill with an incurable disease and believedly will expire within a few months, no consideration be afforded Cammarota for an undercover assignment at this time.

KW:tlc:mem

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26 of the Agents, even though they entered the Bureau subsequent to 1947, have had no experience in connection with their technical training. It would appear ludicrous to endeavor to place these men in an installation wherein they must display some highly technical skill.

Finally, 9 Agents who entered the Bureau since 1947 apparently possess some experience. However, they are not believed adaptable to such assignment. As an example, their experience consists of (1) alcohol beverage chemist; (2) wheat analyst, three months; (3) chemical analyst, five months; (4) Professor of Biology, six months; (5) civil engineer, one year; (6) aeronautical engineer, seven years; (7) high school teacher, two years; (8) civil engineer, four and one-half years; and, (9) marine engineer, seven years. Additionally, 6 of these 9 are married. It is not believed that any of these 9 Agents are qualified for the type of assignment we have in mind. Manifestly, the Agent must possess technical training and/or experience that will permit him to secure a position in an Atomic Energy installation wherein he will have access to restricted data. I can foresee no possibility of utilizing either a civil engineer or an aeronautical engineer in an Atomic Energy installation wherein the Agent would have access to restricted data.

It will be observed that the 58 Agents who entered the Bureau prior to 1947, the 21 who possess experience, along with the 26 who have no experience, and the 9 who possess experience, although not adaptable to this type of assignment, make a total of 114.

OBSERVATION:

It appears from the above that if we are to adhere to original plans of placing qualified technicians in these assignments, which in my opinion is absolutely essential in order for them to secure the positions, there is no choice other than to select Agent Frye, who is single and has been recommended for one of these assignments; Agent [redacted] who although married has no children; and possibly Agent Cammarota, whenever his family situation will permit his departing New York. b6 b7C

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) As indicated above, Agent Frye, who is single, has been recommended for assignment at Los Alamos. It is, of course, suggested that this recommendation still apply.

(2) It is recommended that Agent [redacted] who is married but has no children, be designated for the undercover assignment at [redacted]

(3) With regard to designating some Agent for the assignment at Hanford, it appears that the only alternative is to defer filling this assignment until

Agent Cammarota's family situation will enable him to accept the assignment. It is urgently recommended that he not be placed in this assignment immediately in view of his mother's ill health and further because Agent Cammarota is assigned to the New York Office by request in order that he may be with his mother for the remaining few months.

In the event you approve of recommendations (1) and (2), Agents Frye and [redacted] will be advised, and detailed plans will be effected to facilitate their applying and securing positions at the installations indicated. Should you concur in recommendation (3), the New York Division will be requested to keep the Bureau advised concerning Cammarota's family situation, and whenever he is available for the assignment, efforts will be made to place him in the installation at Hanford, Washington.

b6
b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. H. B. FLETCHER

DATE: August 30, 1949

FROM : MR. V. P. KEAY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

SUBJECT: ATOMIC ENERGY ACT - INFORMANTS

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

It will be recalled that previous memoranda have been written regarding the selection of Agent personnel for undercover assignments in atomic energy installations at Los Alamos, Hanford, and Oak Ridge. My memorandum to you of July 27, 1949, recommended that Agents Frye and [redacted] be designated for the assignments at Los Alamos and Oak Ridge respectively and that we defer filling the spot at Hanford until the family situation of Agent Armand A. Cammarota would permit him to accept such an assignment.

By reference from your office, Agent [redacted] talked to ASAC Belmont of the New York Office at 8:58 a.m. today. Mr. Belmont informed that Agent Cammarota's mother, who was seriously ill, has died and that Cammarota is now available for the assignment if the Bureau still desires to use him.

b6
b7C

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that Agent Cammarota be designated for the assignment at Hanford and that he, as well as Agents Frye and [redacted] be notified of their designation to these assignments. It is also recommended that immediate steps be taken to secure employment for them through the Atomic Energy Commission.

ACTION:

If you agree, this procedure will be initiated immediately.

KW:arm

RECORDED - 111 166-16371-7

9 OCT 26 1949

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60 NOV 15 1949

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: 9/12/49

FROM : THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

#327,013

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/1/91 BY SP-5 Sc/pmt

SUBJECT:

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

The Executives Conference of September 9, 1949, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Quinn Tamm, Harbo, Ladd, Carlson, McGuire, N. H. McCabe, Fletcher, Nease, Rosen, Glavin and Mohr, again considered the problem of placing Special Agents in an undercover capacity in the three Atomic Energy installations at Los Alamos, New Mexico, Oak Ridge, Tennessee and Hanford, Washington. The Conference also considered the desirability of designating married Special Agents for such an assignment.

It was pointed out to the Conference that a complete review was made of the files of all Special Agents who have entered on duty in the past two or three years to determine their technical qualifications for such an assignment. There are available two single Special Agents and one married Special Agent with no children. The Security Division has recommended that in view of the technical qualifications necessary for such an assignment a married Special Agent without children should be considered for this assignment. The Special Agents recommended for this assignment are as follows:

1. RICHARD CHARLES FRYE. This Agent entered on duty on January 24, 1947 as a Special Agent and is presently in Grade CAF 11, $5232 per annum. He is 27, single and comes from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He is presently assigned to the New York Office and formerly worked in the Knoxville Division. He has an extensive background in the field of chemistry. It is proposed that he be assigned to the Atomic Energy installation at Los Alamos, New Mexico.

b6
b7C

2. [redacted] This Agent entered on duty on [redacted] and is presently in Grade CAF 11, $5232 per annum. He is [redacted] years of age, married and has no children. He is presently assigned to the [redacted] having previously served in the [redacted] Division. He majored in chemistry in college and has had seven years experience as a chemist. He comes from New York City. [redacted] has been recommended for assignment to the Atomic Energy installation at [redacted]

3. ARMAND A. CAMMAROTA. This Agent entered on duty in the Bureau as a Special Agent on April 14, 1947 and is presently in Grade CAF 11, $5232 per annum. He is 32 years of age and single. He comes from New York state. He formerly worked in the El Paso Division and is now assigned to the New York Office. He majored in mathematics at college and has had three years experience as a calculating engineer. It is proposed that he be assigned to the Atomic Energy installation at Hanford, Washington.

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enclosures (perm. brief on agents) were detached & filed in agents' personnel file

JPM:DW

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The Bureau record of these employees is entirely satisfactory and permanent briefs of their files are attached. They have been contacted and have manifested interest and enthusiasm in accepting such an undercover assignment.

It is proposed that these Special Agents file applications on their own initiative for positions in the places indicated and to assist them in securing employment they would give the name of Commissioner Lewis Strauss, who has been previously contacted concerning these proposed assignments and is thoroughly in accord with the proposal to place such Agents in an undercover capacity in the installations indicated.

It is proposed that these Special Agents would be retained on the Bureau's payroll and appropriate arrangements would be made to deposit their Bureau pay checks in a bank of their own choosing. They will be paid by civilian contractors working for the Atomic Energy Commission and the salary they receive from such contractors will be returned to the Bureau or the respective SAC by cashiers checks and deposited in the Treasury's Miscellaneous Receipts.

The Conference was unanimous in recommending that immediate steps be taken to further these proposed undercover assignments and that the Agents in question be called to Washington for briefing and preparation for undertaking this work.

Mr. Tolson is opposed to using any married Agents on these assignments because of the possibility that there is a greater risk of exposure as obviously the Agent would have to take his wife into his confidence. Mr. Tolson also points out that even though the Agent proposed for this assignment does not have children, that this is a long range proposition, that children may come hereafter and that it would be difficult to restrain the child from exposing his father's true employment.

The remainder of the Conference feels that the married Agent could satisfactorily handle this assignment, pointing to the fact that we have used married Agents in the past in undercover assignments in this country with apparent complete success.

Should the Director agree with the majority of the Conference, appropriate instructions will be issued to the three Agents to report to Washington for conference and briefing in connection with this assignment and necessary steps will be taken to have them apply for positions at the indicated Atomic Energy installations.

Discussed with Mr Hoover Single agents only 9/13

Respectfully,
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

CC - Mr. Clegg

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: September 15, 1949

FROM : L. B. Nichols

SUBJECT:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

For record purposes, I called on Senator Brien McMahon, chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, on September 14. I outlined to him on a purely informal and confidential basis the idea of placing Agents in undercover capacities in certain atomic energy installations and asked what he thought of the idea.

He inquired as to what specific installations we had in mind. I told him Los Alamos, Oak Ridge and Hanford. He then inquired if this would be with the knowledge of the Commission. I hedged on an answer and asked him what he thought. He thought that someone in the Commission should know about it. I told him that we had given thought to this and that we could take someone into our confidence.

He stated he thought the idea was excellent; that he would go further, that he thought an Agent should be placed at the Chicago installation of the Atomic Energy Commission. This, of course, is at the University of Chicago.

He wondered about payments and records. I told him that we would keep the Agents on our payroll; that anything they received would in a routine manner go to the Treasury Department; that there would be no danger of uncovering the Agents. He thought that the idea and the proposed plan were an excellent security measure and he thought we should go ahead with it. It was specifically emphasized that the matter would be maintained on a confidential basis.

After mentioning the matter to Mr. Tolson this morning, he asked that Mr. Ladd be informed to proceed with the two single Agents; that the Director had concurred that only single Agents were to be used; further, that in the meantime steps should be taken to get hold of a couple of additional Agents who could be used in this assignment.

LBN:hmc

Mr. Ladd advised he read this memo. JPM.

Memo to Ladd 9/28/49 VPK

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3 OCT 26 1949

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. V. P. Keay

DATE: September 27, 1949

FROM : Armand A. Cammarota

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

SUBJECT: SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT AT THE OAK RIDGE ATOMIC ENERGY PLANT

The following procedure is being contemplated by the writer in connection with obtaining employment as a technician at the Oak Ridge Atomic Energy Plant in Tennessee.

COVER STORY:

The writer entered on duty with the Bureau on April 14, 1947 and prior to that time had been employed as a Calculating Engineer at the American Locomotive Company in Schenectady, New York.

(1). Contact Mr. Raymond J. Finch, Chief Mechanical Engineer, American Locomotive Company, and a close personal friend, and request that he allow his name to be used as a reference in the writer's application for employment at Oak Ridge; request him to make no mention of the reason for which the writer terminated his employment at the American Locomotive Company; request him to reflect in any communications which might be received or sent by him that the writer was employed by that Company until July or August of 1949.

(2). Contact Mr. Newell Freeman, formerly a Designing Engineer with the American Locomotive Company and presently an official of the New York State Society of Professional Engineers; will request him to verify the writer's employment at American Locomotive Company as a Calculating Engineer and to be circumspect in answering any inquiries concerning the reason for the writer's leaving that Company or the exact date on which the writer left that Company.

(3) Contact Joseph H. Brown, Production Superintendent, Building 109, General Electric Company, Schenectady, New York, and request that he allow his name to be used as a reference in verifying employment, family background, and personal history.

* * * * * * *

Arrangements for deposit of pay check and for withdrawing funds will be made with the Schenectady Trust Company of Schenectady, New York. The writer maintains a checking account with that bank at the present time.

A stop should be placed with the Schenectady Police Department, Chief of Police Joseph Peters, as Chief Peters and several other members of the Schenectady Police Department know the writer to be a Special Agent of the Bureau.

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OBJECTIVES:

The procedure to be followed by the writer is set forth below.

(1). To obtain employment and to become established as a Laboratory

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Technician at the Oak Ridge Atomic Energy Plant.

(2). (a). To learn as much as possible concerning the dissemination of security data and information.

(b). To locate and identify all persons possibly connected with enemy espionage.

(3). The most likely targets will be new developments in the field of atomic weapons and data and information concerning the amount and extent of the stock pile.

(4). To have knowledge of all persons already known to be security risks who are presently connected with the Oak Ridge Plant.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. V. P. KEAY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

TE: September 27, 1949

FROM : Richard C. Frye

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED OUTLINE OF STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THE WRITER's PROPOSED CONFIDENTIAL ASSIGNMENT

PURPOSE:

The purpose of the confidential assignment is to determine the identity of persons engaged in espionage at the Atomic Energy Commission installation at Los Alamos, New Mexico. The writer will be employed at that installation as a chemist.

COVER STORY:

It will be necessary for the writer to have a cover story for the period of his employment in the FBI. It is suggested that the Bureau advise the SAC of the New York Office to determine from his files a suitable company in New York City for whom the writer could have been employed during this period. The SAC will arrange a conference between a representative of that company and the writer, at which time the necessary details concerning the period of employment will be formulated.

EMPLOYMENT:

The writer's employment record in the questionnaire to be forwarded to the University of California at Los Alamos, New Mexico, will be consistent with his actual experience. It is noted that the writer was last employed as a chemist by the Frankford Arsenal in Philadelphia prior to entering the FBI on January 20, 1947. It is believed advisable that the Washington Field Office contact the Civil Service Commission in Washington, D. C., and that the Philadelphia Office contact the Frankford Arsenal in Philadelphia and advise them that, in the event of an inquiry concerning the writer's employment at the Frankford Arsenal, they could indicate that he resigned to accept other employment, rather than to accept a position with the FBI.

REFERENCES:

The writer proposes to utilize the following known and trusted friends as references: Monsignor James E. Heir, St. Mathias Church, Cynwyd, Pennsylvania; Thomas L. Largey, Greenwood Terrace Apartments, Jenkintown, Pennsylvania; Michael P. Boland, St. Joseph's College, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

The above-mentioned persons will be contacted by the writer and given a minimum amount of information concerning the confidential assignment.

RCF:slm

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MEMO MR. V. P. KEAY September 27, 1949

EDUCATION:

The writer will obtain a transcript of his college record from St. Joseph's College, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and will eventually be forwarded, together with his application to the University of California at Los Alamos, New Mexico.

FINANCES:

The writer will determine a bank in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, through which his personal financial transactions will be carried on from Los Alamos, New Mexico.

METHOD OF APPLYING FOR POSITION:

The writer will apply for the position as chemist with the University of California at Los Alamos, New Mexico, through the usual employment channels; however, prior to forwarding this application to the University of California, it will be sent to the Bureau for review and photostating, and, upon being returned to the New York Office, will be sent to the University of California.

No action on the above procedures will be initiated by the writer until such time as written authority is received from the Bureau.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Referral/Consult

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Ladd

DATE: September 28, 1949

FROM : H. B. Fletcher

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: Agents for Undercover Assignments
AEC Installations

You will recall that Special Agents Richard C. Frye and Armand A. Cammarota are preparing for undercover assignments in the AEC installations at Los Alamos, New Mexico, and Oak Ridge, Tennesee, respectively. Special Agents Frye and Cammarota are single and are the only qualified Agents who are single who have been found for this type of assignment thus far.

The third big installation in which coverage will be extremely important is the Hanford Operation at Richland, Washington. You will recall that Senator McMahon suggested that an Agent be placed under cover at the Argonne National Laboratory in Chicago, Illinois. It was not known why he had this particular spot in mind unless it was because of the loss of uranium there in the recent [redacted]

If we supply Agents in all of these locations, it will, of course, take three more Special Agents who should be sufficiently qualified in chemistry or physics, or allied fields, to work at some job in one of these plants. It is desirable that these Agents not have over two years service in the Bureau because of the difficulty in covering up lengthy Bureau service in connection with their assignment to the AEC installation.

The order of preference in filling these assignments would be as follows:

(1) Hanford Works, Richland, Washington
[redacted]
(3) Argonne National Laboratory, Chicago, Illinois.

It is suggested that this matter be referred to the Administrative Division in order that they can endeavor to procure qualified single Agents for the assignments. It may be necessary to endeavor to get such qualified personnel in one of the new Agents' classes and after a reasonable period of service for indoctrination purposes, to then assign the Agent to one of these undercover operations.

VPK:mls

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3 OCT 26 1949

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Fletcher

FROM : V. P. Keay

DATE: October 4, 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: Special Agent Richard C. Frye
Special Agent Armand C. Cammarota
Special Undercover Assignment

Special Agents Frye and Cammarota, who have been designated for undercover assignments in Atomic Energy Commission installations, reported to the Bureau at 9:00 a.m., September 26, 1949. I went over with them in detail the administrative portion of their assignments and Mr. Whitson of the Espionage Section and his supervisors discussed with them in detail their objectives. In addition, they conferred with Special Agent Magee of the Laboratory, who has more knowledge of the inside operation of the installations involved than anyone else in the Bureau. They also read the data we have from the field offices describing the operations within the installations in question. In addition, they conferred with you and Inspector Laughlin.

Pursuant to the request of AEC Commissioner Strauss, both Agents were introduced to him as it was anticipated he would be listed as a reference. He, however, advised at this time that he considered it would draw too much attention to them to list him as a reference and he suggested that they provide other references. He stated, however, that in the event they did not procure employment through routine channels in a reasonable time, he would without openly putting pressure on, secure them employment. Information regarding the employment, the checking that is done by the contractor, regular methods of seeking employment, etc. was obtained from Brien LaPlante of AEC, who is Mr. Strauss' most trusted assistant. Application blanks are being provided and it has been determined that the contractors merely write letters to former employers, and on some occasions references, in order to obtain data regarding the applicant. None of the contractors involved are carrying on any active investigation at present. Tentative plans were made as follows:

BACKGROUND STORY:

Both Frye and Cammarota will give their true employment up to the time they were employed by the Bureau. They will procure trusted friends as references who can be advised how to answer an inquiry without, of course, the Agents revealing to their friends any details regarding their assignment. Additional steps are necessary as follows:

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ARMAND C. CAMMAROTA

3 OCT 26 1949

Cammarota's principal employment prior to entering on duty with the Bureau was as a Calculating Engineer at the American Locomotive Company, Schenectady, New York. He also had some employment as a clerk at the General Electric Company in Schenectady. Cammarota stated that Mr. Raymond J. Finch, Chief Mechanical Engineer, American Locomotive Company, was his superior there and is presently a

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very close personal friend. He advised that he could use Finch as a reference, and also through Finch he could arrange for an answer to any inquiry received by letter reflecting that Cammarota was employed at the American Locomotive Company until 1949.

Cammarota states he can also furnish the following two personal friends as additional references: Mr. Newell Freeman, an official of the New York State Society of Professional Engineers; and Mr. Joseph H. Brown, Production Superintendent, General Electric Company, Schenectady, New York.

This will take care of Cammarota insofar as a background story is concerned, as well as concerning inquiries to be made by the contractor by letter or otherwise.

RICHARD C. FRYE:

Frye's only prior employment was as a Research Chemist at the Frankford Arsenal in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He stated that he was certain that practically no one knew that he left the Arsenal to accept employment with the Bureau, but that very likely their records would reflect the transfer. In the event that a letter were received from a private contractor regarding his employment , it would be possible either the Frankford Arsenal or the Civil Service Commission might answer by reflecting his transfer to the FBI. The problem, therefore, is merely to insure that any letter received would be answered by reflecting he left the Arsenal to accept another job. It is believed this can be easily done through our Philadelphia Office and the Civil Service Commission in Washington without revealing anything about Frye's present assignment.

With reference to a cover story for Frye for the period he has been in the Bureau, that is, since January of 1947, Frye did not have any story that would be adaptable which could be arranged easily. On discussion it appeared that the best arrangement would be to show him on a traveling job for some company in New York City, which of course would be most difficult to check insofar as any investigation is concerned. The only problem would be to have a company agree to answer a letter by showing he had been employed by them on a traveling job since January, 1947. The best arrangement would seem to be to utilize one of the companies with which we had close contact during SIS days when we did obtain covers by dealing with one top individual in a large number of companies in the vicinity of New York City. It is suggested we could have the SAC in New York make the necessary arrangements after deciding which of these companies we have continued to have close contact with, and which would be most adaptable to our needs. Such companies as those that follow were used as cover companies during SIS days and would be suitable to our present needs:

The Inter Chemical Corporation
United Drug Company
General Bronze Corporation
Johns Manville Corporation
Proctor and Gamble
Klein and Sachs

His job could be traveling as a salesman, for research, or to make surveys.

Concerning references, Frye advised he could use trusted friends as follows: Monsignor James E. Heir, St. Mathias Church, Cynwyd, Pennsylvania; Thomas L. Largey, Jenkintown, Pennsylvania; and Michael P. Boland, St. Joseph's College, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

FINANCES:

It would appear that the simplest method of handling finances would be for the Bureau to mail their checks to a bank designated by them located, of course, away from their place of employment on the AEC installation. It would be necessary that they make appropriate arrangements with their bank, possibly through a Power of Attorney, so that the bank could deposit the check to their accounts. The Special Agents would then mail their checks from the AEC installation where employed to this bank and would once a month write a check to the Bureau for the amount they receive from the private contractor. They would then draw on this bank normally for their regular expenses.

Cammarota stated he could make such arrangements at the Schenectady Trust Company, Schenectady, New York. Frye stated he would make arrangements with a bank in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

CONTACT WITH THE BUREAU:

It appears that the best method of contact with the Bureau in order to submit reports and receive instructions would be to set up an arrangement with the local field office similar to the arrangements in handling informants. There would seem to be no particular problem involved any more than those involved in handling our regular confidential informants. There would be a great advantage in having the local SAC acquainted with the assignment, although the Agents of the office need not know about it, because of the possibility of closer supervision of their work, better facilities for taking care of emergency situations, and better protection locally for covers. It would appear that the local SAC could take care of submitting to the Bureau their expense accounts and similar transactions, handling them in the same manner that they would handle a confidential informant's expense account.

GENERAL ARRANGEMENTS:

An application for employment with the University of California at Los Alamos, New Mexico, was obtained and furnished to Frye, An application for employment with the Carbon and Carbide Corporation at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, is being

obtained for Cammarota. It was determined that applications are normally received by merely transmitting the application with a cover letter. Information is being obtained through Brien LaPlante as to the best jobs to apply for and what jobs are open at the present time along the lines of a Research Chemist and Calculating Engineer. Both Frye and Cammarota were instructed to take no action on the applications and, in fact, to take no action to arrange their cover stories until instructed by the Bureau. They were also instructed when they are advised to proceed to fill out the applications to transmit them to the Bureau for examination prior to the transmittal to the contractors.

They were both instructed as to the necessary secrecy in connection with their assignments and they were advised that the details of the assignments should be revealed to no one. They were advised that when the assignments materialize, the Special Agents of the New York Office or any other Special Agents they were acquainted with should be advised that they had been transferred. Special Agent Frye raised the question of marriage after it had been pointed out to him that single Agents were being used on these assignments. He advised that he had no present intention of getting married, but he wondered what would result in the future should he decide to get married. He explained that he did not want a black mark on his record in the Bureau by disobeying any instructions. I advised him that the Bureau, of course, could not instruct him not to get married, but that I wanted to be certain he had no present intentions of doing so. I also pointed out that if he should decide on marriage in the future, he should, of course, promptly advise the Bureau and it would probably be necessary to take him off the assignment.

Both Special Agents, prior to departing the Bureau, were required to submit a memorandum outlining the plans as discussed above and the instructions which had been given to them.

Messrs. Fletcher and Laughlin discussed the undercover assignments with these Agents. The program was reviewed in detail and the purposes of the assignment were gone into thoroughly. The security aspects of the assignment were emphasized, it being explained to Agents Frye and Cammarota that unless the utmost secrecy is maintained regarding their assignments, the purpose will not be served.

It was explained that the project is something new and the Bureau is entering it with the thought in mind, of course, of becoming aware of any espionage activities now going on or any which might take place in the event of an emergency. These Agents were instructed that they should do their best to become regular normal employees, extending their contacts and affiliations as far as possible without arousing any suspicion.

The administrative details of the operation were reviewed and the necessity for a proper background story covering the time while they were in the Bureau was emphasized. The Agents were instructed that after they had received and

appropriately filled out their applications, these should be forwarded to the Bureau where they would be reviewed, and if approved, would be returned to the Agents for direct transmittal to the appropriate prospective employers.

In response to inquiries as to any suggestions, both Agents asked if it would be possible, after it had been determined what their positions would be, to spend some time, possibly a week or ten days, in the Laboratory with Mr. Magee. They explained that having been away from their respective fields for some time, getting back in the Laboratory and associating with Magee would give them technical terminology and also renew their familiarity with the various technical instruments and apparatus. They were told that this undoubtedly could be arranged.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that:

10/7/44 Done by HBF (1) We advise the SAC in New York telephonically to have Cammarota and Frye proceed to set up their cover stories as outlined at the Bureau and as set forth herein. They should be allowed to make any trips necessary to see their prospective references or former employers. Following the complete setting up of their cover stories, the Special Agents should fill out their applications and forward them to the Bureau with an outline of what they have done to set up their cover stories.

" (2) We instruct the SAC at New York to personally arrange for a cover story for Frye with one of our former SIS cover companies.

10/7/44 Done by HBF (3) We advise the SAC in Philadelphia telephonically to make appropriate arrangements at the Frankford Arsenal and with the local office of Civil Service in Philadelphia in order to insure that any letter of inquiry received will be answered by merely reflecting that Frye left to take other employment. It is also suggested that, through Liaison, we make the necessary arrangements with the Civil Service Commission here in Washington, D. C., since an inquiry might be directed to the central office of Civil Service.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. KEAY

DATE: October 7, 1949

FROM : H. B. FLETCHER

b6
b7C

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

SUBJECT: ATOMIC ENERGY DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM

SAC Boardman called in at 5:20 pm and stated that Special Agent [redacted] had contacted Frankford Arsenal in accordance with my request earlier in the day. [redacted] had contacted Patterson, the Intelligence Officer, and he pulled the personnel card which reflected that Special Agent Frye had left the Frankford Arsenal to go with the FBI. An attempt to erase this record was unavailing so the card will be destroyed and a new one prepared reflecting that he left to take other employment. It was also determined that there was a sub-personnel file in the Chemical Laboratory which had similar notations, and the record there will be destroyed and changed to reflect that he merely left to take other employment. In addition, Patterson placed a stop on the Chemical Laboratory file so that if any inquiry is made, it will be routed to him for reply.

The personnel file of Special Agent Frye covering employment at Frankford Arsenal is in St. Louis. Patterson suggested that it be obtained from St. Louis and forwarded to Washington for any necessary correction in that file.

It was ascertained that the Civil Service Commission has an office at Second and Chestnut Streets, Philadelphia, but Patterson was of the opinion that they would have no record because a suboffice of the Civil Service Commission is maintained at Frankford Arsenal and they utilize the records described herein.

I told SAC Boardman that it would not be necessary for him to call SAC Scheidt; that I would take care of it.

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EX-115

66-16371-13X

61 MAR 22 1950

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. H. B. FLETCHER

DATE: October 11, 1949

FROM : MR. V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT: RICHARD C. FRYE
DOUBLE AGENT ASSIGNMENT - ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

At 4:00 p.m. on October 10, 1949, Mr. Woodrow Bousman, Liaison Representative with the Civil Service Commission, advised SA John N. Dinsmore that all sources in the Fourth Regional Office and the Main Office of the Civil Service Commission had been closed on Richard C. Frye. Mr. Bousman stated he would immediately apprise the Bureau of any inquiries received concerning Frye.

It should be noted that Mr. Bousman requested he be personally notified at such time the need for these stops with Civil Service has ceased.

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JND:a

RECORDED - 111 166-16371-14

ENCLOSURE IN ATOMIC ENERGY INSTALLATIONS

187

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. KEAY

DATE: October 13, 1949

FROM : H. B. FLETCHER

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

SUBJECT: ATOMIC ENERGY DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM

At 2:45 p.m. SAC Scheidt, New York, called in and stated that it had been decided that the Bureau's contact with Eastern Airlines would be utilized to afford a cover company for Special Agent Richard Frye to cover the period of time he has been employed for the Bureau. Further, Special Agent Frye reported that the application blank he is to fill out requires that he list two persons who can be contacted with reference to his education and that two other persons are to be listed who can furnish information as to his professional ability. Special Agent Frye advised that he is confident he can select two persons at St. Joseph's College, Philadelphia, to handle the educational requirements and that he has in mind two persons at Frankford Arsenal.

I instructed that Special Agent Richard Frye proceed with his plans to contact two of the faculty members at St. Joseph's College selected by him, but that at Frankford Arsenal, he should first check the persons selected by him with Patterson, the Security Officer, and then further advise the Bureau before actually making the necessary contacts at Frankford Arsenal. Patterson, you will recall, is the person who arranged to make the necessary changes in the Frankford Arsenal records covering the employment of Frye.

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HBF:tlc

RECORDED - 80

61-16571-14

61 MAR 22 1950

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

b6 Per FBI
b7C

Office Memorandum • UNITED S[illegible]S GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Fletcher

FROM : V. P. Keay

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

October 14, 1949

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: Undercover Assignments
AEC Installations

Reference is made to my memorandum suggesting that the Administrative Division endeavor to procure additional Agents for assignment in an undercover capacity in atomic energy installations. You will recall that only two qualified single Agents have been found and they are to be assigned to the AEC installations at Los Alamos, New Mexico, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The third big installation for which an Agent is desired is the Hanford Project at Richland, Washington. You will also recall that Senator McMahon had suggested the assignment of an Agent to the Chicago Installation and [redacted]

Referral/Consult

The attached list of names referred to me by the Administrative Division has been reviewed, but only one Agent who is qualified was found thereon. This is Special Agent [redacted] presently assigned to the [redacted] He majored in Chemistry in college and, in fact, received a degree in Chemistry, and had about one-half years experience as a Research Chemist with the [redacted] Mississippi. At the time Special Agents were previously being considered for this assignment, [redacted] was in difficulty concerning failure to make an adequate investigation. However, it was found that he was not guilty of dereliction in this respect.

You will recall that consideration has been given to Agents with not more than two years service in the Bureau who have at least a Bachelor's degree in some branch of science, plus some practical experience. It was felt that it would be very difficult to procure desirable positions for Agents who did not have these minimum qualifications. Additional examination was made of the qualifications of Agents who had a degree in science, but no practical experience and the following three Agents may qualify for assignment although, of course, it would be much more difficult to procure them positions.

ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE [redacted]

Majored in Chemistry
Assigned [redacted]

Allen F. Rust
Majored in Chemistry
Assigned New York Field Office

Joseph M. Wuslich
Majored in chemistry
Assigned Seattle Field Office

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Attachment

VPK:mls

APR 3 1950

EX-115

b6 Per FBI
b7C

Memorandum for Mr. Fletcher

All three of these Agents are single and have been in the Bureau approximately two years, although none of them have had any practical experience in the field of science. It will be noted that most of the Agents listed as possibilities for this assignment have had only courses in college Chemistry, Physics, etc. This, of course, would not qualify them for assignment inasmuch as all college graduates have had to take such courses but have not become qualified scientists.

I suggest that [redacted] be interviewed to determine his availability and his suitability for the assignment; and if he is found qualified, that he be assigned to the [redacted]

With respect to Senator McMahon's suggestion that an Agent be placed in the Chicago Installation, there would seem to be no particular reason to place an Agent undercover there since the Argonne National Laboratory is engaged mostly in experimental work in connection with the development of atomic energy for peacetime uses. Senator McMahon probably thought of Chicago because of the recent loss of uranium there that gained great publicity in the newspapers.

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that:

(1) Special Agent [redacted] be interviewed to determine his qualifications for working in the [redacted]

Referral/Consult

(2) We defer on endeavoring to place an Agent in the Chicago installation and [redacted] due to lack of qualified personnel and in order that we can gain experience through operation of the three Agents in the larger plants. If these operations are successful, we can then proceed to establish Agents elsewhere, that is, in Chicago and Kansas City.

I agree
10-14

O.K. Watch this operation very carefully & if effective expand it. H.

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE No. _____

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DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

New York, N. Y.
October 17, 1949.

MEMORANDUM TO MR. VICTOR KEAN:

RE: SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT.

In accordance with instructions previously received, the writer proceeded to Schenectady, New York, on October 12, 1949, and made the necessary arrangements for a cover story and also contacted the references to be used in connection with the special assignment.

A questionnaire, filled in and signed by the writer, is enclosed with this memorandum. There is also enclosed a second questionnaire which has been signed but not filled in. This is being furnished in the event the Bureau desires to make any extensive changes. The facts as shown on the filled-in questionnaire are deemed most plausible since they are all true, with the exception of the period of employment at the American Locomotive Company in Schenectady. The actual period has been changed to reflect that the writer was employed by that Company until September 1949.

The following arrangements and contacts were made in Schenectady, New York, on October 13 and 14, 1949:

Mr. Raymond J. Finch, Chief Mechanical Engineer, American Locomotive Company, was requested to allow his name to be used as a reference and also that he designate the writer's employment with the American Locomotive Company to extend until September of 1949. Mr. Finch assured the writer that he would cooperate with the Bureau to the fullest extent. He said that with respect to the period of the writer's employment he was hesitant to change the Company's employment records without making the matter one of official record. He added, however, that no inquiries were answered by the Company concerning engineering personnel without being referred to him and he stated that should one be received concerning the writer he would take care of it in the manner desired.

Mr. Newell L. Freeman, New York State Education Department, Secretary, Board of Examiners of Professional Engineers, was requested to allow his name to be used as a reference in connection with the special assignment of the writer. Mr. Freeman immediately agreed and advised that he would make no mention of the writer's employment with

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EX-115
66-16371-14X2

b6
b7C

the Bureau but would allow his recommendation to reflect that the writer has been employed in engineering work for the past two and one-half years. He also advised that he is willing to do anything else that might be requested of him, stating that he would not hesitate to recommend the writer through any of the channels open to him as Secretary of the New York State Board of Examiners of Professional Engineers.

Mr. Henry V. Bohn, formerly head of the Engineering Department of the American Locomotive Company, was also requested to allow his name to be used as a reference in connection with the writer's special assignment. Mr. Bohn also readily agreed and stated that he would not allow the writer's connection with the Bureau to become known in anything he might be requested to write. The writer has known Mr. Bohn since 1941 and worked directly under his supervision while employed at the American Locomotive Company.

Mr. Joseph H. Brown, Production Superintendent, Building 109, General Electric Company, was unavailable for interview while the writer was in Schenectady, and therefore his name has not been included on the questionnaire. Also the writer's employment at the General Electric Company from June 1933 to September 1934 is not reflected since the writer deems it inadvisable without first contacting Mr. Brown. Since this employment took place sixteen years ago it does not appear that it would be necessary to include it on instant questionnaire.

Appropriate inquiries were also made at Union College in Schenectady and it was determined that there is no record of the writer's employment with the Bureau on file in the administrative office of the College.

SA [redacted] of the Schenectady Resident Agency, Albany Division, was advised that the writer might go on special assignment with the Bureau and that it was not desired that the writer's connection with the Bureau be disclosed should the Schenectady Police Department receive any inquiries concerning the writer. SA [redacted] advised that the Schenectady Police Department keeps no record of Agents who have come from that city or who have ever worked there. He stated that should he receive any inquiries from members of the Police Department who know the writer personally he would advise them to answer such inquiries in a routine fashion.

SA [redacted] also advised that the Schenectady Credit Bureau does have a record of the writer's connection with the Bureau and that he would take immediate steps to have it removed. He stated he could do this without calling any unnecessary attention to the matter since he has daily contact with that agency. b6 b7C

Two copies of the questionnaire forwarded to the writer are being enclosed. It is noted that at the bottom of each questionnaire there is a red mark designating them as "Encl. 3 1" and "Encl. 3 2". These marks were not placed thereon by the writer, and the significance of such marks is unknown.

Armand A. Cammarota

ARMAND A. CAMMAROTA
Special Agent.

ECX-312

CARBI AND CARBON CHEMICALS RPORATION

POST OFFICE BOX P, OAK RIDGE, TENN.

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DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

QUALIFICATION RECORD

Please answer each question fully — all information will be treated confidentially.

PERSONAL DATA

Name: Cammarota, Armand A. (last / first / middle)

Date: Oct. 17, 1949

Present address: 423 McClellan St. (number / street)
Schenectady 4, New York (city / state)

Present Telephone No. 6-6661 (Sch'dy) Social security No. 126-10-4050

Permanent address: 423 McClellan St. (number / street)
Schenectady 4, New York (City / state)

Marital status: Single No. of dependents: None Age: 32

Date of birth (if employed you will be required to present birth certificate or other evidence): Dec. 22, 1916

Are you a citizen of U. S. Yes If not a citizen, how long in U. S. -

Have you filed first papers - Date of such filing -

Sex: Male Height: 5'10" Weight: 165#

Physical limitations: None

Any recent serious illness: No

Father's full name: Pasquale Cammarota

Father's occupation (past or present): General Electric Co. (Retired)

Type of work applied for: Engineering; Research; production

Date available: Immediately

By whom referred to this company:

Previously employed by this corporation or company: No

Name relatives or friends employed by this company: None

Work in which you are most experienced: Engineering

Work for which you wish to train, such as production, sales, research, etc.: Any of the above

Are you willing to accept employment at any of our branches or plants in the United States and be transferred as the company may require: Yes

If No, please explain:

Are you willing to travel (as may be required) if employed: Yes

If no, please explain:

To be notified in case of emergency: Name: Miss Gloria Cammarota Relationship: Sister

Address: 423 McClellan St.; Schenectady, 4, New York Telephone No. 6-6661

EDUCATION

School or Institution Location	No. of Years	Were You Graduated	Year Left	Courses Taken and Degree
All grade and high schools attended were in Schenectady, N.Y. Graduated in 1933 from Mont Pleasant High School with a College Preparatory Diploma.				
Union College	4	Yes	1938	Math & Science A B Degree
Union College	1		1941	Additional courses toward a Masters Degree

In which subjects did you excel: Mathematics

In which subjects were you most interested: Mathematics In which subjects did you specialize: Math and Chemistry

What foreign languages do you speak: Italian, Spanish Read: Same Write:

Did you receive any academic honors in college: No

Brel 3

Was your scholastic standing above average, average, or below average Average

Did you win any letters or numerals in any sports Lacrosse, basketball

What part did you take in extra-curricular affairs, such as debating, athletics, social service work, publications, etc. Associate Editor of College Yearbook, Intramural sports, football, baseball

Please mention any membership in class organizations, students' societies or offices held

Please name any U.S. military, business, professional or fraternal organizations (excluding Labor Unions or organizations of a religious, racial or foreign national character) to which you belong

If not in college, are you studying now No What and where

What further courses do you expect to take Courses in mechanical and chemical engineering in furtherance of a Professional Engineer's License.

BUSINESS EXPERIENCE, INCLUDING SUMMER WORK & U. S. MILITARY SERVICE

	Company	Street Address and City	Date Month	Date Year	Position	Reason for Leaving
Present or Last Position	Mr. R. J. Finch-CME	Engineering Dept.	From June	1941	Calculating Engr.	No work
	American Locomotive Co.	Nott St;Schenectady,N.Y.			Dept. Head	R. J. Finch
	Line of Business and Products		To Sept	1949	SALARY	$4,000 per annum
	Manufacturers of steam and diesel locomotives					
Next Position	Company	Street Address and City	Month	Year	Position	Reason for Leaving
	College		From Sept	1940		
					Dept. Head	
	Line of Business and Products		To June	1941	SALARY	
Next Previous Position	Company	Street Address and City	Month	Year	Position	Reason for Leaving
	Employed as a laborer and surveyors helper in		From June	1938		
	and around New York City, on construction jobs.				Dept. Head	
	Line of Business and Products		To Sept	1940	SALARY	
	Jobs were numerous and of short duration. Details will be furnished on request.					
Next Previous Position	Company	Street Address and City	Month	Year	Position	Reason for Leaving
	College		From Sept	1934		
					Dept. Head	
	Line of Business and Products		To June	1938		
					SALARY	
U.S. Military Service	Military Assignment	Area	Month	Year	Highest Rank	Special Training
	U.S. Marine Corps	American Theatre	From July	1945	Sgt.	Classification specialist
	Type Activity		To Aug	1946		

Please state on next page any further facts or details concerning your experience and training which explain more fully your qualifications for the employment for which you are applying. If there is not sufficient space to record in detail your work experience and training, we suggest that you give us this information on separate sheet and attach hereto.

While employed at the American Locomotive Company in Schenectady, my chief duties were in making mathematical calculations in the design, manufacture and production of steam and diesel locomotives. During the war years I also did some work on the design and manufacture of Army Tanks. It was also part of my job to make cost and time estimates on new designs in locomotive construction.

Work with relation to steam locomotives has recently been discontinued at the Schenectady Plant of the American Locomotive Co. and a number of the employees have been released or offered other jobs. Since this field will become more limited as time goes on, I am desireous of obtaining employment in a new field.

PLEASE CHECK ANY OF THE FOLLOWING IN WHICH YOU ARE EXPERIENCED

Check		Years Exp.	Kind, Method or System	Check		Years Exp	Kind, Method or System
	Clerical field				Promotion		
	Correspondence				Advertising		
	Statistics				Publicity		
X	Engineering	7	Mechanical		Sales		
	Financial				Purchasing		
	Accounting			X	Research	3½	*
	Control				Sales		
	Credit				Domestic		
	Insurance				Foreign		
	Legal				List others		
X	Production	3½					
	Technical						
	Time-Study—Rate Setting						
	Warehousing—Shipping						

* Engineering problems in the manufacture of steam and diesel locomotives.

PERSONAL REFERENCES

Please give names, etc., of three persons other than former employers or relatives who have known you more than 3 years. Do you authorize us to secure confidentia reports on your character and ability from present employer and any or all of your former employers and personal references_____

Name in full	Street Address and City	Business	Years Known
Mr. R. J. FINCH	1529 Union St. Schenectady, New York	Chief Mechanical Engineer American Locomotive Co.	20
Mr. NEWELL L. FREEMAN	23 South Pearl St. Albany, New York	Secretary, New York State Board of Examiners of Professional Engineers	9
Mr. H.V.BOHN	RD 1, Lisha Kill Road Schenectady, New York	Retired - Mechanical Engineer, American Locomotive Co.	9

Please state the approximate salary which you expect $5,000 per annum Signature Armand A Cammarata

Please send this completed application form to _____ Name _____ Company _____ Location

NOT TO BE FILLED IN BY APPLICANT

Application noted by:		Interviewed by:	
Name	Date	Name	Date
		ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL	

Notes: (including test results, if any) _____

TO BE FILLED IN BY DEPARTMENT HEAD

Applicant engaged by: Co. _____ Location _____ Dept. _____

Position _____ Date Effective _____ Rate per month _____

Signature of Dept. Head _____ Approved by _____

Applicant engaged by: Co. _____ Location _____ Dept. _____

Position _____ Date Effective _____ Rate per month _____

Signature of Dept. Head _____ Approved by _____

SPACE BELOW FOR USE BY EMPLOYMENT OR PERSONNEL OFFICE

Notes _____

Records complete for filing _____

Employment Dept.

EMPLOYMENT RECORD

Date	Action	Company	Department	Position	Notes

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. H. B. FLETCHER HBF

DATE: October 18, 1949

FROM : MR. L. L. LAUGHLIN

SUBJECT: RICHARD C. FRYE
SPECIAL UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENT

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

The above Agent, who is presently in Philadelphia for the purpose of making preparations in connection with a confidential assignment, called through the Philadelphia Field Office at 11:10 A.M. today. He advised that he had been in the Frankford Arsenal and had checked with Mr. R. A. Patterson, Security Officer there, on Mr. Ernest R. Rechel and James W. Mitchell. Rechel is one of the Directors of the Chemical Laboratory at Frankford Arsenal and Mitchell is one of the principal chemists in the Research Department. Frye had previously worked under both of these individuals. He determined through Mr. Patterson that both of these persons had been cleared, Rechel for top secret material and Mitchell for secret material. Frye stated that he also has checked the indices of the Philadelphia Office and found nothing derogatory on either of these persons. Mr. Frye stated that unless the Bureau was of a contrary opinion he proposed contacting Rechel and Mitchell today for the purpose of arranging with them so that they will furnish anyone inquiring about Frye's background, information which will fit into his new assignment.

In the event that one of the above two persons is not available Mr. Frye stated that he would get in touch with Mr. C. C. Fawcett, who is the Director of the Chemical Laboratory at Frankford Arsenal. This individual likewise has been cleared for top secret material, according to Security Officer Patterson, and in addition the Philadelphia Field Office conducted an Atomic Energy Act investigation of Fawcett without developing any derogatory information.

Mr. Frye was advised that unless he received contrary instructions by 1:00 P.M. today it would be satisfactory for him to approach two of the three people mentioned above.

LLL:mer

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United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
New York - New York

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FILE No. _____

October 25, 1949.

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PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO MR. H. B. FLETCHER

RE: CONFIDENTIAL ASSIGNMENT
SPECIAL AGENT RICHARD C. FRYE

COVER STORY

Through the efforts of the Special Agent in Charge of the New York Office, Edward Scheidt, a meeting was arranged between Captain E. V. Rickenbacker, of the Eastern Airlines, Inc., and Mr. Scheidt and Special Agent Richard C. Frye of the New York Office. At this meeting Mr. Scheidt carefully explained to Captain Rickenbacker that the writer was to undertake a confidential assignment and in connection with the assignment it would be necessary to show employment during the past two and one-half years with an organization other than the FBI. Captain Rickenbacker expressed a hearty willingness to cooperate with the Bureau in this matter and personally assigned Mr. Beverly Griffith, Director of Public Relations with Eastern Airlines, Inc., to aid the writer in chosing a logical position with that organization and to familiarize him with the duties and functions of the position and in general the policy of the company. It was agreed upon by Mr. Griffith and the writer, and later approved by Captain Rickenbacker, that the writer could have been employed as a Special Representative to Captain Rickenbacker conducting research and surveys to determine the passenger and traffic potential of cities under consideration for air surveys by Eastern Airlines, Inc.

In connection with the proposed position, Mr. Griffith furnished the writer with sufficient Eastern Airlines, Inc. confidential research reports to afford him a working knowledge of the duties and functions of the position involved. In addition, he verbally and through printed literature provided the writer with a complete history of the Airline, its present policy, activities and functions, and also a brief biography of Captain Rickenbacker.

The complete picture of the proposed position was presented to Captain Rickenbacker by the writer and he fully approved of every detail outlined. Therefore, the above mentioned position is being utilized in connection with the application for employment being submitted by the writer to the University of California at

RCF:gu

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~~at~~ Los Alamos, New Mexico. In addition, Captain Rickenbacker has furnished the writer with a letter of reference which may be used in securing a position in the field of chemistry. This letter is being forwarded to the Bureau as an enclosure to this memorandum and, unless advised to the contrary, a photostatic copy of this letter will be forwarded to the University of California as an enclosure to the writer's application for employment. Captain Rickenbacker further indicated that any inquiry emanating from the University of California concerning the writer's past employment with Eastern Airlines Inc. would come to his attention and would be answered by him personally; also that prior to answering any unusual inquiry concerning the writer's past employment Captain Rickenbacker would contact the Special Agent in Charge of the New York Office for whatever additional information may be necessary. It can be noted at this point that Captain Rickenbacker has indicated on his file copy of the letter of reference the exact period of employment, salary, position and duties involved, which can be referred to in the event of an inquiry.

BANK

Arrangements have been made with the National Bank of Germantown and Trust Company, Germantown Avenue and School House Lane, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the writer to maintain a special checking account with that bank. Checks being forwarded to the bank shall be credited to the account of the writer and the receipts for such deposits shall be forwarded to the writer through the Bureau.

APPLICATION FOR EMPLOYMENT

In connection with the application for employment being furnished to the University of California at Los Alamos, New Mexico, by the writer, it was necessary to contact three references, two persons at the Frankford Arsenal, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and two members of the faculty at St. Joseph's College, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. These individuals were sufficiently advised of the nature of the confidential assignment so that they would be able to intelligently answer any inquiry that might be forwarded them by the University of California. The persons contacted are as follows:

References

Monsignor James E. Heir, St. Mathias Church,
Bryn Mawr and Highland Avenue, Bala, Pa.

Mr. Thomas F. Largey, Apartment 3-D,
Greenwood Terrace, Jenkintown, Pa.

Dr. Edward A. Kelly,
State Road and Addingham Avenue,
Drexel Hill, Pa.

At Frankford Arsenal

Mr. E. R. Rechel
Mr. James W. Mitchell

At St. Joseph's College

Reverend Joseph J. Molloy
Mr. Michael P. Boland

This application has been completed by the writer and is being forwarded to the Bureau as an enclosure to this memorandum. It is noted that the application is to be dated and signed by the writer prior to being sent to the University of California at Los Alamos, New Mexico, from the writer's home address, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

ENCLOSURES

1. Application for employment being submitted by the writer to the University of California at Los Alamos, New Mexico.

2. Letter of reference from Captain E. V. Rickenbacker to the writer.

[illegible] & sent out with mig application for [illegible]

Richard Frye

RICHARD C. FRYE
Special Agent

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY

LOS ALAMOS, NEW MEXICO

EMPLOYMENT APPLICATION FOR PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL

To enable the employer to discharge its obligations under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and regulations thereunder, the following facts are submitted for the information of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. All of the following statements are made voluntarily by the applicant.

In filling out this questionnaire please use pen or typewriter. Every question should be answered. Write "NONE" when applicable. Use additional sheets if necessary. Please read this questionnaire completely before answering any questions. Return the completed questionnaire to: Employment Office, P. O. Box 1663, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

Date.....

(1) Name RICHARD (First) CHARLES (Middle) FRYE (Last) (Other names including maiden name)

(2) Present address 5026 GREENE ST. (Street), PHILADELPHIA (City) 44, PA. (State)

(3) Normal home address or principal residence for past 15 years.
5026 GREENE ST. (Street), PHILADELPHIA (City) 44, PA. (State)

(4) List all permanent addresses for past 10 years.

ADDRESSES (APARTMENT OR R.F.D. NUMBER, STREET, CITY AND STATE)	DATES IN RESIDENCE FROM	TO
5026 GREENE ST., PHILADELPHIA 44, PA.	10-1-49	PRESENT
APT. 707, HOTEL DAUPHIN, 67th + BROADWAY, NEW YORK, N.Y.	1-27-47	10-1-49
5026 GREENE ST., PHILADELPHIA 44, PA.	9-1-39	1-27-47

(5) Present telephone numbers VICTOR-8-2071 (Home) NONE (Business)

(6) Social Security number 183-14-1227

(7) Sex MALE Race WHITE Color of Hair BROWN Color of eyes BLUE
Height 5'11" Weight 180 lbs.

(8) Have you any nervous disorder, physical defect or disability? Yes ☐ No ☒

If "yes" give details:

Form 239R—10M—6/49

(9) Place of birth: PHILADELPHIA (City), PHILADELPHIA (County), PENNSYLVANIA (State or Country)

(10) Date of birth: FEBRUARY (Month) 16 (Day), 1922 (Year) Age, last birthday: 27

(11) Citizenship: U. S. A. ☒ Other ..... (Specify)

If U. S. A. citizen, indicate whether:

(a) By birth ☒

(b) Derivative ☐ ..... (Date) ..... (Certificate Number) ..... (Place)

(c) By naturalization ..... (Petition Number) ..... (Date)

..... (Certificate Number) ..... (Place)

(12) List foreign countries visited since 1930 exclusive of military service.

COUNTRY	DATE		PURPOSE OF VISIT
	LEFT U.S.A.	RETURNED U.S.A.	
NONE			

(13) Marital status: Single ☒ Married ☐ Divorced ☐ Separated ☐ Widow (er) ☐

(14) Number and relationship of persons who normally live with you: NONE

(15) List relatives. List even though deceased; if divorced, list ex-spouse.

	NAME IN FULL	AGE	ADDRESS	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	PRESENT CITIZENSHIP
Father	GEORGE Joseph FRYE, SR.	63	5026 GREENE ST. PHILADELPHIA 44, PA.	U.S.A.	U.S.A.
Mother	ANNA GENEVIEVE FRYE	60	5026 GREENE ST. PHILADELPHIA 44, PA.	U.S.A.	U.S.A.
Spouse					
Children (Give age and sex)					

(15) *(Continued)* List relatives. (List even though deceased.)

	NAME IN FULL	AGE	ADDRESS	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	PRESENT CITIZENSHIP
Father-in-law					
Mother-in-law					
Brothers	Philip Thomas Frye	33	348 West Park Lane Clifton Heights, Pa.	U.S.A.	U.S.A.
	George Joseph Frye, Jr.	29	Edgewater Beach Apts. Honolulu, Hawaii	U.S.A.	U.S.A.
	Dr. John Louis Frye	26	U.S. Naval Station Great Lakes, Illinois	U.S.A.	U.S.A.
Sisters	Ann Marie Frye	35	6026 Greene St. Philadelphia 44, Pa.	U.S.A.	U.S.A.

(16) List any professional society of which you are a member:

NAME	ADDRESS	TYPE OF ORGANIZATION	MEMBERSHIP FROM	MEMBERSHIP TO
None				

(17) List names of three respo[illegible]e and well-established citizens over 30 yea[illegible] age, not relatives or previous employers, who are well acquainted with you.

NAME	ADDRESS	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION	YEARS KNOWN
MONSIGNOR J.E. HEIR	ST. MATHIAS CHURCH BRYN MAWR + HIGHLAND AVE, BALA, PA.	CLERGYMAN	15
THOMAS F. LARGEY	APT. 3D GREENWOOD TERRACE JENKINTOWN, PENNSYLVANIA	ACCOUNTANT	15
DR. E.A. KELLY	STATE ROAD + ADDINGHAM AVE. DREXEL HILL, PENNSYLVANIA	PHYSICIAN	10

(18) Have you ever been arrested or convicted for any violation of the law other than a minor traffic violation?

Yes ☐ No ☒ If "yes," list offenses:

CHARGE	DATE	WHERE COMMITTED	DISPOSITION

(19) Are you registered under Selective Service? Yes ☒ No ☐

Local board number 83 Address 45 MAPLEWOOD AVE., (City) PHILADELPHIA 44, (State) PA.

Your order number 11665 Your classification 1-C

Date classification expires DISCHARGED

(20) Military service: Country U.S.A. Branch of service U.S. ARMY

Date of entry into service OCTOBER 27, 1944 Serial number 33838809

Grade or rank attained PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Citations or decorations received GOOD CONDUCT MEDAL, AMERICAN THEATRE RIBBON + WORLD WAR II VICTORY RIBBON

Date of discharge MARCH 15, 1946 Type of discharge HONORABLE

Legal residence when discharged 5026 GREENE ST., (Street) PHILADELPHIA (City) 44, (State) PA.

(21) Are you a member of the National Guard or any armed forces reserve? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, specify the unit

EDUCATION

(22) List high schools or trade schools attended.

NAME OF SCHOOL	ADDRESS	ATTENDANCE FROM	ATTENDANCE TO	MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY
ROMAN CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOL	BROAD + VINE STS. PHILADELPHIA, PA.	9-1-35	6-8-39	ACADEMIC
J.E. MASTBAUM VOCATIONAL SCHOOL	FRANKFORD + CLEMENTINE STS. PHILADELPHIA, PA.	10-1-39	5-1-40	DRAFTING

(23) Give, for each undergradu or graduate college degree, the informatio quested. If you have no degree, but have some college education, give school, major field of study, minor field of study and attending dates. If any of the education indicated was received at night school, give approximate day-school equivalent in semesters, quarters or years.

School ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE.	School
Location 54TH & CITY LINE AVE. PHILADELPHIA, PA.	Location
Dates in attendance 9-2-40 TO 10-24-43	Dates in attendance
Major field of study CHEMISTRY	Major field of study
Minor field of study Philosophy	Minor field of study
Degree B.S. IN CHEMISTRY Date conferred 10-24-43	Degree Date conferred
Day-school equivalent of night school NONE	Day-school equivalent of night school
School	School
Location	Location
Dates in attendance	Dates in attendance
Major field of study	Major field of study
Minor field of study	Minor field of study
Degree Date conferred	Degree Date conferred
Day-school equivalent of night school	Day-school equivalent of night school

(24) If you have taken courses at the college level for which you have not received credit toward a degree, or if you have taken correspondence courses or studied any particular subject informally, please explain fully. WHILE A MEMBER OF THE U.S. ARMY STATIONED IN PHILADELPHIA I STUDIED BOTANY AT ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE FRIM JANUARY 1945 TO APRIL 1945. NO CREDIT RECEIVED WHEN TRANSFERRED IN THE ARMY.

(25) Explain any special studies including thesis titles and graduate level student research: NONE

(26) If you have indicated graduate work, under whom was it performed: NONE

(27) Indicate your scholastic standing in your college class.

Upper third ☐ Middle third ☒ Lower third ☐

(If you have had less than ten years professional or technical experience, a transcript of your college record must be included with this application.)

(28) List any academic honors received in college NONE

(29) List subjects in which you were most interested in college Chemistry, Philosophy, History + English

(30) Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages.

LANGUAGE	READ			SPEAK			UNDERSTAND		
	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR
French			✓			✓			✓

(31) List two or more college faculty members familiar with your scholastic record, including head of department.

Name Rev. Joseph J. Molloy, S.J.
School St. Joseph's College
Address 54th + City Line, Philadelphia, Pa.
Title Head of Department
Department Chemistry

Name Michael P. Boland
School St. Joseph's College
Address 54th + City Line, Philadelphia, Pa.
Title Registrar + Instructor
Department Education

Name
School
Address
Title
Department

Name
School
Address
Title
Department

(32) List participation in extra-curricular collegiate affairs such as debating, publications, student societies, sports, etc.

Students Intramural Athletic Program, College Chemistry Society, Physics Seminar + St. Joseph's College Student Sodality.

(33) What are your hobbies or recreations? Tennis, Swimming + Photography. I am also interested in most spectator sports.

(34) Indicate any specialized training in the Armed Forces.

Army ☐ Navy ☐ Marine Corps ☐ Coast Guard ☐ Other NONE (Specify)

Course NONE	Course
School	School
Dates in attendance	Dates in attendance
Course completed? Yes ☐ No ☐	Course completed? Yes ☐ No ☐
Certificate received? Yes ☐ No ☐	Certificate received? Yes ☐ No ☐

(35) List articles or theses published.

Subject or title NONE	Subject or title
Publication (Indicate if thesis)	Publication (Indicate if thesis)
Date published	Date published
Subject or title	Subject or title
Publication (Indicate if thesis)	Publication (Indicate if thesis)
Date published	Date published
Subject or title	Subject or title
Publication (Indicate if thesis)	Publication (Indicate if thesis)
Date published	Date published

(36) List U. S. and foreign patents.

PATENT NO.	DATE GRANTED	DESCRIPTIVE TITLE
NONE		

EXPERIENCE

(37) List employment record showing present position first. Account for all employment and any periods of unemployment. Include all military experience in your professional or technical field. Specify any work done for the Manhattan Engineer District.

Dates of employment: From JANUARY 27, 1947 To OCTOBER 1, 1949

Name of employer CAPTAIN EDWARD V. RICKENBACKER

Complete address of employer EASTERN AIR LINES, INC., 10 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA, NEW YORK, 20, N. Y.

Type of business AVIATION — TRANSPORTATION

Name and title of immediate supervisor CAPTAIN EDWARD V. RICKENBACKER, PRESIDENT, EASTERN AIR LINES, INC.

Title of position you held SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

Salary per month $350 or wage per hour — Number of persons you supervised NONE

Equipment you used NO SCIENTIFIC EQUIPMENT USED.

Duties WHILE ASSOCIATED WITH CAPTAIN RICKENBACKER I CONDUCTED VARIOUS RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND SURVEYS TO DETERMINE THE PASSANGER AND FREIGHT POTENTIAL IN CITIES UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR AIR SERVICE BY EASTERN AIR LINES, INC.

Reason for leaving RESIGNED TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT IN THE CHEMISTRY FIELD.

Dates of employment: From APRIL 1, 1946 To JANUARY 17, 1947

Name of employer FRANKFORD ARSENAL

Complete address of employer FRANKFORD ARSENAL, TACONY & BRIDGE STS., PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA.

Type of business U. S. ARMY ARSENAL

Name and title of immediate supervisor MR. E. R. RECHEL, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF THE CHEMISTRY LABORATORY

Title of position you held CHEMIST

Salary per month $300 or wage per hour — Number of persons you supervised NONE

Equipment you used STANDARD EQUIPMENT USED IN QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS.

Duties TESTED VARIOUS STANDARD INORGANIC QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS METHODS AND DEVISED NEW METHODS TO BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH WORK BEING CONDUCTED BY THE DIFFERENT RESEARCH SECTIONS WITHIN THE ARSENAL LABORATORY.

Reason for leaving RESIGNED TO BECOME ASSOCIATED WITH CAPTAIN E.V. RICKENBACKER

Dates of employment: From AUGUST 2, 1944 To APRIL 28, 1945

Name of employer FRANKFORD ARSENAL

Complete address of employer FRANKFORD ARSENAL, TACONY & BRIDGE STS., PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA.

Type of business U. S. ARMY ARSENAL

Name and title of immediate supervisor MR. E. R. RECHEL, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF THE CHEMISTRY LABORATORY

Title of position you held CHEMIST

Salary per month $270 or wage per hour — Number of persons you supervised NONE

Equipment you used SAME AS ABOVE

Duties SAME AS ABOVE

Reason for leaving [I WAS A MEMBER OF THE U.S. ARMY STATIONED AT THE FRANKFORD ARSENAL FROM 10-27-44 TO 4-28-45 WHEN TRANSFERRED.

Dates of employment: From NOVEMBER 1, 1943 To July 20, 1944

Name of employer E. G. BUDD MANUFACTURING CO.

Complete address of employer E. G. BUDD MANUFACTURING CO., HUNTINGPARK AVE & MIDVALE ST., PHILADELPHIA, PA.

Type of business SHEET METAL MANUFACTURING CO.

Name and title of immediate supervisor MR. G. B. BLAINE, CHIEF INSPECTOR

Title of position you held AIRCRAFT INSPECTOR

Salary per month $205 or wage per hour — Number of persons you supervised NONE

Equipment you used BLUEPRINTS & VARIOUS MEASURING DEVISES.

Duties INSPECT AIRCRAFT SUB-ASSEMBLIES AGAINST BLUEPRINTS FOR CORRECT ASSEMBLY & MEASUREMENTS, PROPER WORKMANSHIP & MATERIALS.

Reason for leaving ACCEPTED CHEMISTRY POSITION AT FRANKFORD ARSENAL.

Dates of employment: From JUNE 20, 1942 To SEPTEMBER 2, 1942

Name of employer E. G. BUDD MANUFACTURING Co.

Complete address of employer E. G. BUDD MANUFACTURING Co.,
HUNTINGPARK AVE + MIDVALE ST., PHILADELPHIA, PA.

Type of business SHEET METAL MANUFACTURING Co.

Name and title of immediate supervisor MR. G. B. BLAINE — CHIEF INSPECTOR

Title of position you held BOMB INSPECTOR

Salary per month — or wage per hour 80¢ Number of persons you supervised NONE

Equipment you used BLUEPRINTS + VARIOUS MEASURING DEVISES.

Duties INSPECT BOMBS PASSING ALONG ASSEMBLY LINE FOR CORRECT MEASUREMENTS, WORKMANSHIP, MATERIALS + PAINT FINISH.

Reason for leaving RETURNED TO SCHOOL.

Dates of employment: From To

Name of employer

Complete address of employer

Type of business

Name and title of immediate supervisor

Title of position you held

Salary per month or wage per hour Number of persons you supervised

Equipment you used

Duties

Reason for leaving

Dates of employment: From.....

Name of employer.....

Complete address of employer.....

.....

Type of business.....

Name and title of immediate supervisor.....

.....

Title of position you held.....

Salary per month.....or wage per hour.....Number of persons you supervised.....

Equipment you used.....

Duties.....

.....

.....

.....

Reason for leaving.....

Dates of employment: From.....To.....

Name of employer.....

Complete address of employer.....

.....

Type of business.....

Name and title of immediate supervisor.....

.....

Title of position you held.....

Salary per month.....or wage per hour.....Number of persons you supervised.....

Equipment you used.....

Duties.....

.....

.....

.....

Reason for leaving.....

(38) List two or more persons familiar with your professional experience and ability.

Name MR. E. R. RECHEL	Name MR. J. W. MITCHELL
Address FRANKFORD ARSENAL, TACONY & BRIDGE STS., PHILADELPHIA, PA.	Address FRANKFORD ARSENAL, TACONY & BRIDGE STS., PHILADELPHIA, PA.
Name	Name
Address	Address

(39) List licenses you have held in any trade or profession such as engineer, architect, electrician, radio operator, etc.

Trade or profession NONE	Trade or profession
Type of license	Type of license
Date issued	Date issued
Date expired or expires	Date expired or expires
Trade or profession	Trade or profession
Type of license	Type of license
Date issued	Date issued
Date expired or expires	Date expired or expires

(40) If you are employed now, why do you desire to change your position? I RESIGNED MY POSITION WITH CAPTAIN RICKENBACKER ON 10-1-49 TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT IN CHEMISTRY.

(41) May we consult your present employer regarding your qualifications? Yes ☒ No ☐

(42) Indicate preference for type of work. Research ☐ Development ☐ Production ☒ Administration ☐

Other (Specify)

(43) What entrance salary would be acceptable to you? $ 420 per month.

(44) How soon could you report for work? IMMEDIATELY

(45) If you were referred to this laboratory by someone, or if you have been interviewed by a member of our staff, give details.

NONE

(46) Please add on attached sheets any additional information you wish to supply.

I certify that the information given above is correct and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that knowingly making a false statement herein may be deemed sufficient cause for rejection of this application or dismissal after employment.

Date

(Usual Signature of Applicant)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6
b7C

TO : Mr. Fletcher

DATE: November 3, 1949

FROM : V. P. Keay VPK

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

SUBJECT: [redacted]
Undercover Assignment - AEC

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tyler Room
Nease
Gandy

Pursuant to instructions, I interviewed Special Agent [redacted] of the Washington Field Office regarding his availability for assignment in an undercover capacity to the Hanford AEC Installation at Richland, Washington. [redacted] had no personal problems which would preclude his accepting this undercover assignment and advised that he thought he could successfully handle the assignment.

You will recall that [redacted] majored in Chemistry at [redacted] Mississippi, and had almost one year's experience as a Research Chemist with the [redacted] Mississippi. He has served in the [redacted] Field Offices only and has been in the Bureau since [redacted] He has never been on the west coast and knows no one connected with the atomic energy program.

[redacted] stated that while with the [redacted] he did general chemical tests. He advised that he believed he could arrange with this company confidentially to show his employment until the present date in order to cover up his service with the Bureau. He has had no other employment He saw no difficulty in arranging for suitable references and a complete cover story.

[redacted] makes a good impression and appears qualified for the assignment.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that we have [redacted] proceed in arranging a cover story, following which he would submit an application for employment with the General Electric Company, who operates the Hanford Installation. It is also recommended that, as we did with the two prior Agents who were prepared for undercover assignments, we introduce [redacted] to Admiral Strauss, who has agreed to furnish assistance in getting this employment if necessary. Strauss, you will recall, specifically requested that he be able to meet the Agents in order that he could say they are known to him if it becomes necessary.

RECORDED : 80

11-16371-1485

EX-115

VPK:mls

Mrs. Glavin concurs =
I agree
Permanent brief attached - detached & sent to Personnel
11/7/49

53 MAR 28

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. V. P. KEAY

DATE: November 8, 1949

FROM : S. W. REYNOLDS

SUBJECT: ATOMIC ENERGY DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Reference is made to the memorandum to you from Mr. Fletcher in the above-captioned matter dated October 7, 1949 which suggested that the personnel file on SA Frye be obtained from the Army Records Office at St. Louis in order to be certain that any record that Frye is now with the FBI be deleted.

This is to advise that this matter has been discussed with Lt. Colonel Lynch of the Intelligence Division who has advised that he will procure Frye's record and discuss the matter further with the writer.

This matter will be followed with Colonel Lynch and you will be advised as to any action taken.

SWR:mk

INDEXED - 80
RECORDED - 80

EX-115

61 MAR 22 1950

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SAC, NEW YORK

NOVEMBER 9, 1949

DIRECTOR, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

ARMAND A. CAMMAROTA;
RICHARD C. FRYE;
UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS - AEC

There are returned herewith the completed application forms of Special Agents Armand A. Cammarota and Richard C. Frye. You should advise these two Agents to transmit these applications to the respective companies through normal channels in order to make application for the positions desired. These Special Agents should be instructed, of course, to keep the Bureau closely advised as to their progress in obtaining employment in connection with their undercover assignments at the AEC installations at Los Alamos, New Mexico, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

RECORDED - 2

VPT:ls

Enclosure

-15

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6
b7C

TO : MR. H. B. FLETCHER

DATE: November 14, 1949

FROM : MR. V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT: [redacted]
UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENT - AEC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Sandy

Reference is made to my memorandum dated November 3, 1949 concerning the availability of SA [redacted] of the Washington Field Office for an undercover assignment at the Hanford AEC Installation at Richland, Washington.

SA [redacted] was again interviewed today during which time the problem of an appropriate cover was discussed with him. Following his graduation from [redacted] Mississippi, he was employed for nearly a year as a Research Chemist with the [redacted] Mississippi. He entered the Bureau directly from this employment in 1947. SA [redacted] advised that he can work out a suitable cover with the [redacted] to show continuous employment from his college graduation to the present. He further stated that arrangements can be made to cover references, residence, police and credit. SA [redacted] will secure from [redacted] a transcript of his grades.

Two copies of the application for employment with GE has been furnished to [redacted]

In order to make detailed arrangements for the above, it will be necessary for SA [redacted] to go to Greenville, Mississippi and Jackson, Mississippi. It is believed that these details can be worked out in a period of two or three days.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that SA [redacted] be instructed to proceed to Mississippi in order to make the detailed arrangements for his undercover assignment. It may be noted that leave has been approved by the [redacted] to have annual leave starting December 9 until the first work day in 1950. Due to the urgency of this assignment, it is suggested that [redacted] proceed immediately to Mississippi to make the necessary arrangements.

OHB:mk

RECORDED - 80

66-16371-15X

EX-115

14 DEC 30 1950

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE No. _____

New York, N. Y.
November 25, 1949.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. H. B. FLETCHER:

RE: CONFIDENTIAL ASSIGNMENT, SA RICHARD C. FRYE

Undercover Assignments In Atomic Energy Installations

There is enclosed herewith a photostatic copy of the communication received by the writer from the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico. This letter is self explanatory.

It is requested at this time that the Bureau make necessary arrangements through liaison channels to have the writer placed in a position with the University of California at Los Alamos, New Mexico. It is further requested if possible that the writer be advised of progress being made towards this end.

Richard C. Frye
RICHARD C. FRYE
SA

Enclosure
RCF:MT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

RECORDED - 111

66-16371-16
DEC 16 1949
37

1 ENCL

54 JAN 3 1950

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY
(CONTRACT W-7405-ENG-36)
P. O. Box 1663
Los Alamos, New Mexico

November 21, 1949

IN REPLY REFER TO: PER-1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

Mr. Richard C. Frye
5026 Greene Street
Philadelphia 44, Pennsylvania

Dear Mr. Frye:

It is with regret that we must inform you, after consideration of your application for employment with this Laboratory, that there are no openings at the present time for one with your training and experience, nor is it likely that such an opening will occur in the foreseeable future.

We shall be glad to keep your application in our active file for reconsideration at a later date if you are interested in the prospect of future employment at Los Alamos. Please let us hear from you concerning this.

Your interest in this Laboratory is sincerely appreciated.

Very truly yours,

E. W. Doty
Assistant Employment Director

EWD:bm

Rec'd 11/23/49
Via Air Mail

tates Department
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

b6
b7C

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
FILE No. _____ HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

NOVEMBER 28, 1949
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM TO MR. VICTOR P. KEAY

Re: SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT

In accordance to oral instructions received from Mr. O. H. Bartlett, the writer proceeded to Jackson and Greenville, Mississippi, on November 19 and made necessary arrangements for a cover story to be used in connection with this assignment.

AT JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI:

References

[redacted] and [redacted] Jackson, Mississippi, and [redacted] home address [redacted] were contacted and advised that the writer is being considered for a special assignment and that no mention of the writer's employment with the Bureau should be made in the event an inquiry is received. Both assured the writer that they would cooperate to the fullest extent. The writer has known [redacted] for the past seven years and during that time has visited in his home on numerous occasions as a close friend of his son. The writer has known [redacted] as a close friend for the past eight years.

Employment

[redacted] co-owners of the [redacted] advised that in the event an inquiry is received no mention of the writer's employment with the Bureau will be made. The records of that company show the writer to have been employed on April 16, 1943, on a part-time basis for approximately one year. [redacted] stated that the answer to any inquiry would deal with the writer's duties while employed with the [redacted] and the dates of employment.

[redacted] advised that a notation was placed in the writer's personnel file showing that the writer was employed with [redacted] as a Research Chemist [redacted] at a starting salary of $175 and resigned [redacted] to seek employment in the writer's home town. The salary upon resignation was shown as $213. [redacted] appeared cooperative and stated that the above information would be given to anyone making inquiry.

RECORDED - 80

66-16371-16X

Personnel

8 APR 3 1950

EX-115

b6
b7C

Criminal and Credit

Mr. Ralph H. Hargrave, Identification Officer, Jackson Police Department, advised that no record of the writer was located in the files.

Mr. M. A. Cutler, Representative of Dun and Bradstreet, Incorporated, Room 101, Barnett-Madden Building, advised that no record of the writer was located in the files.

Mr. Henry G. Flowers, Attorney and former FBI Agent, owner of the Jackson Retail Credit Association, 242½ East Capitol Street, advised that a notation was made on the writer's credit record to show employment with the [redacted] and that no reference to employment with the Bureau will be made in the event of inquiry.

Mr. Ralph Edfelt, Chief Clerk, Retail Credit Company, Incorporated, 223 Hederman Building, 145 Amite Street, advised that a stop notice was placed on the writer's credit record and that a notation was made to the effect that no mention of the writer's Bureau employment should be made in answer to inquiry.

Education

A transcript of college records, which was requested on the application for employment with the General Electric Company, was obtained from [redacted] who are personal friends of the writer and who were very cooperative, advised that any inquiry received at [redacted] concerning the writer would be answered by one of them and that no mention of the writer's employment with the Bureau will be made.

[redacted] equivalent of [redacted] Street, advised that in the event inquiry is received concerning the writer no mention will be made of the writer's employment with the Bureau.

AT GREENVILLE, MISSISSIPPI:

References

[redacted] were advised that the writer is being considered

b6
b7C

for a confidential assignment and that in the event an inquiry is received no reference should be made to the writer's employment with the Bureau. Both [redacted] have been close friends of the writer's family for approximately fifteen years and assured the writer of their cooperation in this matter.

Credit and Criminal

Captain Al Tackett, Greenville Police Department and a graduate of the National Academy, advised that no record of the writer was located in the files.

Miss Dorothy Poole, Commercial Credit Corporation, 123 South Poplar Street, advised no record of the writer was located in the files.

Miss Wanda Hubbard, Universal-CIT Credit Corporation, 242 Main Street, advised no record of the writer was located.

Mrs. Alice M. Burke, Merchants Credit Bureau, Main Street, advised that that credit bureau maintains a record of the writer, however, no mention is made of Bureau employment.

Bank

Through [redacted] arrangements were made whereby checks may be forwarded to that bank and credited to the writer's account.

Respectfully,

[redacted]

Special Agent

CFW:iml

SAC, EL PASO

December 7, 1949

DIRECTOR, FBI

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENT
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

The Bureau has worked out a program whereby Agents will be placed in undercover assignments at various important Atomic Energy installations throughout the country. In an effort to work out an effective plan for the placing of these Agents, your recommendation is requested as to the advisability of approaching an [redacted] It will be recalled that [redacted] on a number of occasions in the past. Before making any contacts with the [redacted] you should furnish your recommendations in this matter to the Bureau, at which time further details will be forwarded to you.

b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

CHB:hc

DEC 7 1949

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

New York, N. Y.
November 18, 1949.

CONFIDENTIAL

Director, FBI

Attention: Mr. H. B. Fletcher

RE: CONFIDENTIAL ASSIGNMENT
SA ARMAND A. CAMMAROTA

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to my telephone conversation of November 18, 1949 with Mr. Howard Fletcher of the Bureau. As I advised Mr. Fletcher, the application form of SA Cammarota which was transmitted to the New York office by the Bureau's letter of November 9th was turned over by me to SA Cammarota on November 10th and on the following day he mailed it to the Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp., at Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

SA Cammarota has received a reply from the Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp., H. P. Shreiner, Employment Department, dated November 14, 1949, advising him that at the present time they can offer him no encouragement with respect to placement. A copy of the letter from the Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp. to Mr. Cammarota is transmitted to the Bureau herewith.

Very truly yours,

Edward Scheidt

EDWARD SCHEIDT
SAC

ES:MT
Encl.

DEC 17

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

COPY

CARBIDE AND CARBON CHEMICALS CORPORATION
Unit of Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation
UCC
Post Office Box P
Oak Ridge, Tenn.

November 14, 1949

Mr. Armand A. Cammarota
423 McClellan St.
Schenectady, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Cammarota:

This will acknowledge receipt of your recent application for employment with this organization. We regret to advise that at the present time we can offer you no encouragement with respect to placement.

We wish to thank you for your interest and desire to become associated with us.

Very truly yours,

CARBIDE AND CARBON CHEMICALS CORPORATION

(signed) H. P. Shreiner

H. P. Shreiner
Employment Department, K-25

HPS:cb

66-16391-17

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

SAC, Knoxville

December 7, 1949

Director, FBI

UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS IN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Bureau has worked out a program whereby agents will be placed in an undercover capacity in various key Atomic Energy installations throughout the country. As you can well appreciate this matter is of the utmost delicacy. The Bureau would appreciate your recommendation as to whether an appropriate official of the Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation at Oak Ridge could be approached in an effort to obtain employment at Oak Ridge for a Bureau Agent. Before contacting any official at Oak Ridge, you should advise the Bureau of your recommendation in this matter, at which time details will be furnished to you.

GWB:hb

F B I

70 DEC 8 1949

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Laud
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

DEC 7 1949

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

TO : MR. H. B. FLETCHER ... cember 7, 1949

FROM : MR. V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT: UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENT
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

You will recall that a plan has been approved whereby agents will be placed at strategic atomic energy installations in an undercover capacity. Special Agent A. A. Cammarota has filed an application with Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation, the prime contractor at the Atomic Energy Installation at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation has advised Agent Cammarota that they could afford him no encouragement with respect to employment at this time. Special Agent Richard C. Frye has filed an application with the University of California, the prime contractor of the Los Alamos Atomic Energy Commission Laboratory. Agent Frye has received a reply from them stating there are no openings at the present time and it is not likely that such openings will occur in the foreseeable future.

These undercover assignments were discussed on a highly confidential basis with AEC Commissioner Strauss at the time it was in the original planning stage. Strauss at that time stated he would like to be informed if any difficulty was experienced in obtaining employment for these agents. The replies received by Cammarota and Frye have been discussed by Agent [redacted] with Strauss and he was of the opinion that the only course open was to contact a highly reliable and important official of the companies involved and obtain employment for the agents through this source. b6 b7C

You will recall that under the Bureau's SIS program, the Bureau went to key officials of companies throughout the country and through them worked out plans whereby agents would be sent out of the country in an undercover capacity as representatives of these companies. This procedure was highly effective. It is felt that the same procedure might be worked out in connection with the Atomic Energy Program.

It is known that the El Paso Office has very good relations with

[redacted] b7D

ACTION:

If you approve, the attached letters will be forwarded to the El Paso and Knoxville Offices asking for their recommendation as to whether officials of the University of California and Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation might be approached on this matter.

ATTACHMENT

CWB:hb:mk

66-16371-17X1

RECORDED - 114

DEC 21 1949

EX-78

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JAN 9-1950

278

SAC, ALBUQUERQUE

Director, FBI

UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

January 12, 1950

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reburlet December 7, 1949, to El Paso which was forwarded to you by F and G letter dated December 29, 1949. This letter advised that consideration was being given to placing of Bureau Agents in Atomic Energy installations in undercover capacity. Your recommendation as to the advisability of approaching an appropriate official of the University of California at Los Alamos regarding this matter was solicited. This letter also set out that [redacted] has been cooperative with the Bureau in the past. b7D

No answer has been received from your office concerning this matter and a prompt reply is requested.

WHE:eb

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

RECORDED - 34

100-16371-18
JAN 17 1950
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Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
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Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

SAC, Knoxville

Director, FBI

January 11, 1950

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Rebulet December 7, 1949, in the above-captioned matter in which the Bureau solicited your recommendations as to whether an appropriate official of the Carbide and Carbon Chemical Corporation for Oak Ridge could be approached in an effort to obtain employment at Oak Ridge for a Bureau Agent.

No reply has been received from you in this matter and you are requested to immediately transmit to the Bureau your recommendations.

DHB:eb

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

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JAN 13 1950
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Clegg
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Tele. Room
Nease
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

SAC, Knoxville

January 17, 1950

Director, FBI

RECORDED - 11
EX-55

UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20

Reference is made to your letter dated January 6, 1950 in the above-captioned matter.

You set forth several suggestions in connection with the placing of a Bureau agent in an undercover capacity in the Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

For your information, the agent selected for this assignment would, of necessity, have a scientific background and therefore should be placed in that phase of atomic energy where it is believed he could do the most good. At this time the Bureau has not considered the placing of an undercover agent in any area outside the scientific area.

In connection with the use of either [redacted] you stated that it was a possibility that the identity of the undercover agent would get back to the top officials of the Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation and even to Atomic Energy Commission officials. As you know, if the barest possibility along this line existed the Bureau could not afford to use an undercover agent. It would be appreciated if you would advise the Bureau in more detail as to why you believe the undercover agent would be identified.

b7D

The possibility of using the distributor of the Pan-Am Petroleum products as a cover is not deemed feasible in view of the fact that the undercover agent would not actually be on the inside of the operation.

You are requested to give this matter additional thought, possibly along the lines of the usage of the [redacted] and the Bureau should be advised concerning this matter immediately.

CHB:mk mk

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
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Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
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JAN 17 2 44 PM '50
RECEIVED-TOLSON
F B I
U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE

18 10 02 AM '50

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

TO : DIRECTOR FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

DATE: January 6, 1950

FROM : SAC KNOXVILLE

SUBJECT: UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS IN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION INSTALLATION

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Reference is made to Bureau letter to Knoxville dated December 7, 1949, requesting the recommendations of this office as to whether or not an appropriate official of the Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation could be approached in an effort to obtain employment at Oak Ridge for a Bureau Agent.

Several methods of approach could be used to attain this end, each having its special advantages and disadvantages. Mr. CLARK C. CENTER, General Plant Manager, Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation, has been contacted by representatives of this office on several occasions, and he has been found to be reliable, cooperative and to have a sound desire for successful security of atomic energy information. It is, therefore, felt that a discreet and well-founded approach to him in this matter would be met with favor by Mr. CENTER, and his complete cooperation could be expected.

The disadvantage of soliciting the aid of Mr. CENTER is found in the high degree of importance placed on internal politics by the personnel of the Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation. Due to this fact, any person employed at Carbide, who had been sponsored by Mr. CENTER, would, by way of the "grapevine," be quickly earmarked as CENTER's "boy," and would be treated as such by his fellow employees. Accordingly, it would be extremely difficult for a person working on an undercover assignment, with this type of notice placed upon him, to obtain that information which would be desirable to the Bureau. He would not be readily accepted by the other personnel as a confidant, and he would not be in a position where he could receive unreserved entree into those groups in which the Bureau would be interested.

The attention of the Bureau is invited to the fact that the most valuable Agent within the Atomic Energy Commission Installation at Oak Ridge would be one who was well-versed in scientific matters. His field could be either chemistry, physics or engineering, and he would be able to fit into the people of the community. However, it has come to the attention of this office that generally when persons in either of these three fields are employed at Oak Ridge, they have been either recommended or sponsored by someone already at Oak Ridge, and usually

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INDEXED - 11

JAN 25 1950

COPIES DESTROYED
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EX-55

a person of some reasonable degree of importance. In this regard, it is possible that [redacted] who is [redacted] might be able to utilize his position, without creating any suspicion, to obtain employment for a scientifically-trained Agent. [redacted] has not been utilized extensively by this office as an informant; however, he has been very cooperative on those occasions when he was contacted, and it is felt that the proper approach to him in this matter would be successful.

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b7D

In this same train of thought, the services of [redacted] might also be utilized. [redacted] In this position, he might be able to work into his group another person with some scientific training, particularly since that particular vicinity [redacted] is probably the most [redacted] both from espionage and a sabotage standpoint. Therefore, it would be a good base of operations for an undercover assignment.

The disadvantage of using the two persons just mentioned and the method of placing an Agent discussed concerning each of them would lie in the fact that if the undercover agent engaged in those activities at Oak Ridge which would be necessary for him to be of full value, it could well and probably would get back to top officials of Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation, and even to Atomic Energy Commission officials, who would then directly approach either [redacted] if their services had been used in obtaining this employment. Therefore, to utilize this method, the Agent being assigned must, of necessity, be very carefully briefed and instructed as to the situation at Oak Ridge and its many ramifications, as well as have sufficient opportunity to talk with the individual securing his employment, whether it be [redacted] to the extent that a very logical, clear and precise story would be at the disposal of the Agent concerning his previous acquaintance and association with these individuals prior to beginning his employment at Oak Ridge.

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Another possibility exists, which from the standpoint of Bureau security would be very favorable, but which would make the job more difficult for the Agent handling the undercover assignment. Special Agent CHARLTON C. McSWAIN of this office is personally acquainted with Mr. JOHN BRYSON, of Harriman, Tennessee, who is the Pan-Am distributor

for that area and does considerable business at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Agent McSWAIN has known BRYSON for a little better than two years and has gotten to know him well. It is his belief that BRYSON is dependable in every respect, loyal to the United States without any possible doubt, a man whose integrity can be trusted, and a person who would most certainly be discreet. Due to the volume of business which BRYSON now handles on the Oak Ridge Area as the distributor of Pan-Am Petroleum products, BRYSON must maintain considerable contact with the Atomic Energy Commission and with persons living in the Oak Ridge vicinity. It is possible that some arrangement might be worked out with Mr. BRYSON wherein it would be to his advantage to open a branch office at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. It is felt that he could be persuaded to do so and that a Bureau Agent operating in undercover assignment could be employed by him as his representative at Oak Ridge to handle this branch office. Details of the actual approach on such a matter and arrangements as to its actual operation can be made later, if this seems at all plausible to the Bureau.

The disadvantage to this last possibility lies in the fact that the undercover assignment would not give ready access to any type of classified facility and the total value of the Agent would lie in his ability to become associated with those individuals at Oak Ridge who are of interest to the Bureau, by virtue of his actual and active participation in those organizations and groups at Oak Ridge which are considered questionable. This again would necessitate considerable briefing as to the groups of interest, the best method of approach and the type of personalities involved.

Should the Bureau desire to furnish this office with more information as to how the administration of this undercover assignment is to be handled, it is possible that a more practical, secure and less cumbersome method of obtaining employment for this Agent might be obtained. It is certainly felt by this office that an undercover agent would be of great value to the Bureau at Oak Ridge, could be quite productive, and it would certainly seem that some practical method of placement, with reasonable security, can be found.

SAC, Albuquerque PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ January 26, 1950

Director, FBI

UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Reference is made to the Bureau letter dated December 7, 1949, to El Paso, which was forwarded to you by P & C letter dated December 20, 1949, and to the Bureau letter to you dated January 12, 1950.

You are requested to immediately reply concerning this matter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

OHB:arm

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

JAN 30 1950
80

FEB 1 1950

SAC, Knoxville PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ January 26, 1950

Director, FBI

UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Rebulet January 17, 1950, in the above-captioned matter.

You are requested to give this matter your immediate attention and your reply should be sent to the Bureau forthwith.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

OHB:arm

RECORDED - 52

JAN 30 1950

80

22

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

MAILED 17
JAN 26 1950
COMM - FBI

56 FEB 1 1950

SAC, Seattle

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 26, 1950

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

The Bureau is considering the placing of undercover agents in important atomic energy installations including the General Electric Hanford Works at Richland, Washington. These men will have scientific backgrounds and it is believed that their best work could be accomplished by utilizing this training.

The Bureau would appreciate your recommendations as to whether an official of the General Electric Company at Richland, Washington, could be approached in an effort to obtain employment at Richland for a Bureau Agent. Before contacting any official at General Electric, you should advise the Bureau of your recommendations in this matter.

This matter is of the utmost urgency and an immediate reply is requested.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

OHB:arm

RECORDED

JAN 26 1950

JAN 30 1950

23

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC-150

Code

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

FEBRUARY 3, 1950

Transmit the following message to:

SAC, SEATTLE

TELETYPE — URGENT

UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS, ANC. REBULET JANUARY TWENTY-SIX LAST.

COMPLY WITH REQUEST IMMEDIATELY.

HOOVER.

CHB:arm

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

1808-1812

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Garnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hear
Mr. Harrington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

TELETYPE

FEB 3 1950

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

RECORDED - 35

66-1871-24

SENT VIA 1:45 V M Per Tilet

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAC, Washington

February 28, 1950

Director, FBI

Undercover Assignments
Atomic Energy Commission

You are requested to advise Special Agent [redacted] that no action is being taken at this time in connection with his proposed undercover assignment which has previously been discussed with him.

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You should request Special Agent [redacted] to immediately advise the Bureau in the event correspondence is received by him from the General Electric Company as a result of his filing an application for employment with that company.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

RECORDED

25

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC-150

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

Transmit the following message to:

FEBRUARY 3, 1950

SAC, ALBUQUERQUE

Code

TELETYPE — URGENT

UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS, ABC. DEBRIEF JANUARY TWENTY-SIX LAST. COMPLY WITH INSTRUCTIONS IMMEDIATELY AND ADVISE REASON FOR DELAY.

HOOVER.

ONB:arm

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

Exc Ex 1708-1808

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Garnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

TELETYPE

FEB 3 1950

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

RECORDED - 33

EX - 8

FEB 3 12 17 PM '50
RECEIVED RECORDS
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

SENT VIA 1:50 P M Per

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAC, NEW YORK

February 28, 1950

DIRECTOR, FBI

UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

You are instructed to advise Special Agents Richard A. Frye and Armand A. Cammarota that no action is being taken at the present time in connection with their proposed undercover assignments in atomic energy installations, which had previously been discussed with them.

You should further request these Agents to immediately advise the Bureau in the event they receive any communications from the companies with which they have filed applications.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM : Mr. Keay

DATE: February 28, 1950

SUBJECT: Undercover Assignments
Atomic Energy Commission

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Sandy

BACKGROUND

You will recall that consideration was given to placing three Special Agents with scientific backgrounds in undercover capacities in the three top atomic energy installations, Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, and Hanford. Special Agents Richard A. Frye, Armand A. Cammarota, and [redacted] were selected for this assignment. After appropriate background data was agreed on, these men filed applications with the following companies:

Special Agent Frye	University of California Los Alamos, New Mexico
Special Agent Cammarota	Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation Oak Ridge, Tennessee
Special Agent [redacted]	General Electric Company Hanford, Washington

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b7C

Soon after filing their applications for employment, all three Special Agents received replies from the above-mentioned companies to the effect that no positions were open but that their applications were being kept on file.

In the meantime, correspondence has been maintained between the Bureau and the Albuquerque, Knoxville, and Seattle offices concerning the placement of these undercover Agents. These three offices are daily in touch with the local situations at the atomic energy installations and all three offices agreed that the placing of undercover Agents in the atomic energy program was extremely hazardous and explosive. SAC Wilcox of Seattle suggested that the only safe entree for placing an undercover Agent at Hanford would be through the President of the General Electric Company.

SAC Wyly of Albuquerque recommended not approaching the officials of the University of California at Los Alamos inasmuch as he believed the proposition would not be well received. He further pointed out that such an approach may get back to a Senate Investigating Committee and if so there may be some inquiries which would be embarrassing to the Bureau. SAC Wyly did suggest, however, that it might be possible to contact [redacted] on the basis that we desired to obtain a position for a man and setting forth his qualifications. Further, we could advise him this individual is in need of a job and the FBI will vouch for his loyalty and integrity. SAC Wyly pointed out that if [redacted] were approached relative to securing an undercover job for an Agent, he would be ever thinking he had a "stool pigeon" in the midst of his work.

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OHB:mls

Attachment

RECORDED - 62 SE 25

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1950

Another suggestion set forth by Wyly was to the effect that former Special Agent [redacted] is [redacted] and that possibly his services could be used in giving employment to an undercover Agent with the Sandia Corporation, a subsidiary of Western Electric. If this could be accomplished, a transfer would be necessary from the Sandia Base installation to the Los Alamos facility. b6 b7C

The SAC, Knoxville, advised that some of the installations at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, are as much as 14 miles apart and that there is no movement of personnel from one plant to another except on unusual occasions or specific assignments. He further pointed out that even within the plants, departmentalization is practiced to a considerable degree. This thought was set forth to show that one person operating in an undercover capacity at Oak Ridge would be operating in a very small cubicle and would not be able to determine the overall picture. It was pointed out that at Oak Ridge, persons employed in certain areas where the bomb parts are machined are periodically subjected to polygraph examinations.

The SAC at Knoxville pointed out that in view of the magnitude of the operation at Oak Ridge it might be desirable to have several undercover Agents rather than just one. It was further suggested that employment at Oak Ridge could be secured easier if some noted scientist, technician, or University official could be prevailed upon to personally recommend the individual for the job. The Knoxville Office has two confidential informants at their disposal who might be in a position to place an Agent in an undercover position. The SAC stated, however, that he felt that only one of these confidential informants could possibly be utilized, but this was complicated by the fact that this informant is periodically subjected to a polygraph examination and if the examiner chanced upon a line of questioning that paralleled the informant's participation in this activity, a reaction would be recorded.

In view of the above suggestions, it is felt that probably the safest and most expeditious way of placing Agents in undercover assignments in atomic energy facilities would be through the Presidents of the operating companies. There appear to be complications and pitfalls in the other suggestions set forth.

OBSERVATIONS:

At this time it is not believed desirable to use these top company officials in the absence of a specific or tangible case involving the atomic energy program. The applications of these prospective undercover Agents will be maintained on file and in the event that it is activated, the matter can be taken up at that time. In the event of an emergency or an important tangible case involving the atomic energy program, it is believed that the soliciting of the cooperation of the company Presidents would be productive.

It may be pointed out that at the time this matter was first discussed with Commissioner Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commission, he stated that he

could be helpful in placing undercover Agents. Later, Admiral Strauss advised that he would rather not actively assist in placing these men. You will recall that Admiral Strauss is leaving the Atomic Energy Commission on April 15, 1950.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that:

(1) This matter not be pursued further at this time.

(2) The applications of the three prospective undercover Agents be left pending for possible future use.

(3) The attached letters be sent to the New York and Washington Field Offices where the three prospective undercover Agents are assigned so that the Special Agents in Charge can confidentially advise these men that no action is being taken at this time in connection with the proposed undercover assignments.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Tele. Room
Mr. Neese
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: December 20, 1949

FROM : SAC, El Paso

SUBJECT: UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENT
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I am transmitting a copy of the Bureau's letter dated December 7, 1949 to the SAC at Albuquerque, New Mexico with a suggestion that he furnish recommendations to the Bureau concerning this matter.

According to my experience [redacted] is most cooperative and could be expected to cooperate in this matter. SAC WYLY, however, may desire to confer with ASAC H. O. HAWKINS and Senior Resident Agent [redacted] prior to reaching any final conclusion.

b6
b7C
b7D

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DKB:adl

cc - SAC, Albuquerque (Encl.)

1/11/50 letters to Knoxville & Albuquerque requesting reports

RECORDED - 60

EX-115

66-16371-28

139

61 MAR 22 1950

Undercover Assignment in Atomic Energy Commission

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. V. P. KEAY

DATE: December 27, 1949

FROM : Mr. C. W. ~~BATES~~

SUBJECT: ATOMIC ENERGY DUAL AGENT PROGRAM

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

Reference is made to memorandum to you from Mr. Fletcher dated October 7, 1949, suggesting that the personnel file on Special Agent Frye be obtained from the Army Records Office at St. Louis in order to make certain that any record regarding Frye's connection with the Bureau be deleted.

This matter was originally discussed with Lieutenant Colonel John Lynch of the Intelligence Division. After checking into the matter Colonel Lynch has now informed that the only reference in Frye's file concerning the Bureau is the fact that he transferred employment from the Army to the FBI. Lynch said he asked that this be removed from the file but was informed by the AGO that it could not be done without a formal letter explaining why such a request was being made. Lieutenant Colonel Lynch was informed that no further action should be taken in this matter.

You will recall that at the present time the field has been requested to make recommendations as to the advisability of contacting a high official in the companies involved regarding the placing of Agents in the Atomic Energy Program. If such a plan is worked out, any possibility of the contractor contacting the Army would be very remote. It is not believed that any further action should be taken on this request until further details have been worked out.

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EX-115

61 MAR 22 1950

HANFORD WORKS

NUCLEONICS DEPARTMENT

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY

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b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

Richland, Washington

January 5, 1950

[redacted]
[redacted] Mississippi

Dear Mr [redacted]

Thank you for submitting your employment application for our consideration.

It has been reviewed with members of our various divisions, and we regret to indicate that we are unable to offer you a position in line with your interests and qualifications. We are returning your college transcript of credits for use in your personal file but are taking the privilege of retaining your employment application for subsequent review.

We sincerely appreciate your interest in obtaining employment with the General Electric Company and are sorry that we had to give you a negative answer.

Very truly yours,

D. W. Haught

D. W. Haught
Technical Personnel

DWH:vh
Enc.

File

RECORDED

71-30

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Candy

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 1-26-50

FROM : SAC, Knoxville

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Rebulet 1-17-50.

Referenced letter requests further comment of this office on the possibility of the identity of an undercover agent becoming known to the officials of the Atomic Energy Commission or the Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation. By Knoxville letter to the Director of 1-6-50 there was no intent to convey the impression that the identity of the Bureau informant would be revealed in such way that his connection with the Bureau would become known or that it would even render him totally valueless to the Bureau. Rather, it was being pointed out that his activities might come to the notice of the security agencies at Oak Ridge and that [redacted] might be called in for information concerning the undercover agent, if the services of said informants had been utilized in securing his position. b7D Per FBI

Referenced letter also requested further discussion of the possible means whereby an undercover agent might be placed in Oak Ridge and the problems which would be encountered in such undertaking.

Before pursuing this specific problem, it is felt advisable to review rather briefly the situation existent at Oak Ridge, Tennessee with regard to administration of personnel, physical arrangement of plants and residences and the general nature of everyday life within this area which is unique to those installations controlled by the Atomic Energy Commission. It is possible that some of the things being brought out in this letter are unique to Oak Ridge and do not hold true for the other Atomic Energy Commission installations. [redacted]

CCM/pa
66-808

66-16371-21

Referral/Consult

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EX-115

61 MAR 22 1950

By consideration of the above it becomes evident that no one individual can give coverage to the entire installation by reason of information which comes to his attention at his work. Nor is it possible to say that any one particular place is more important from a sabotage or espionage standpoint than is any of several other places. Therefore, a definite statement as to where an undercover agent could be of most value is quite difficult to make.

Perhaps it would be well to consider this matter from an extremely long range and comprehensive counter espionage standpoint. In such light it would be desirable to have several persons of scientific or technical background planted within the facilities at Oak Ridge. Varied methods of placement could be used as well as variation of the means by which these persons place themselves in the position of being "recruited" by a subversive agent. By the same token, should one of the persons so planted be transferred or in some manner compromised so that his value was greatly diminished, then the loss of one such person would not completely destroy the Bureau's coverage of the facility. It is not believed that the cost of several such persons would be prohibitive to the Bureau in that at most it should not be necessary to do more than to subsidize the salary which they will receive from the contracting company for services performed in their job.

If it were possible to find a number of persons with the necessary qualifications for this sort of work, it would perhaps be advisable to have them submit applications for employment through the Atomic Energy Commission in Washington in the normal procedure. In this manner no one would be aware of any connection they may have with the Bureau and maximum security of this fact could be achieved. It would, of course, be a great advantage in placing them in certain positions and assuring their employment if some noted scientist, technician or university official could be prevailed upon to personally recommend the person for the job. All such details would, of course, hinge upon the actual scientific training and background of the person being considered.

It is therefore felt that the gradual infiltration of scientifically or technically trained undercover agents into the installations would be far more effective and more secure with as little deviation from the norm as possible. This would not immediately place the agent in the most advantageous places, but by transfer and requests of change of assignment he may work himself into the best spot once he is on the inside. Referral/Consult

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place the informant in a most embarrasing position and one for which it will be difficult for him to give satisfactory explanation.

As a discussion of this matter goes forward, the above three groups should constantly be borne in mind in order to arrive at a true evaluation of the problem. By Bureau letter to El Paso dated March 11, 1949 entitled "Atomic Energy Act - Informants," it is stated that there are three principal objectives which the Bureau would desire to attain through the use of this informant. Namely, (one), to determine the extent, if any, of Communist Party activities by individuals employed within the vital installation; (two), to determine if leaks already exist within a particular installation whereby the Communists are securing restricted data; and (three), to build up the informant to a position whereby he will become "bait" to the Communists and/or Soviets.

With these objectives in mind it becomes apparent that any individual operating at Oak Ridge in an undercover assignment must, by subtle innuendo and participation in certain organizations on the area, convey the impression to those individuals around him that he is "liberal," dissatisfied with the present form of United States Government, has questionable regard for security of information, a favorable attitude toward the Soviet, or otherwise place himself in a position whereby he would be a likely recruit for a Communist Party agent or Soviet agent. At the same time such activities must not be of such degree and such extent that his notoriety would be beyond the point of reasonable security to the subversive agent attempting to contact him. In other words, a compromise must be made, but the point of compromise must be sufficiently advanced along the pro-Soviet lines that by the time his reputation has been established, which may take six, twelve or even eighteen months, and he has sufficiently ingratiated himself with those individuals at Oak Ridge who are possible agents, that his identity as a person of questionable intent and loyalty would have come to the attention of one of the three groups enumerated above as being charged with security. This is not to say that the identity of this individual as an undercover agent of the Bureau would necessarily be known. In fact, this could quite effectively be covered except under the most extreme circumstances imaginable. However, once AEC Security or comparable security has been aware of his presence and activity, they will place him in a category with those individuals with whom he is associated and will carefully follow his movements in so far as can be done by them without openly conducting any investigation. Possibly reports received by them would be referred to the Bureau for its information and consideration.

It has been the observation of this office that the Security Division of AEC at Oak Ridge is in the position of being unable to do anything, or at least have done nothing, concerning those persons employed in the installation about whom they have suspicions but on whom they have no indisputable evidence of subversive activity. Therefore, if the agent handling the undercover assignment did so with intelligence and care he could possibly operate indefinitely without the security groups taking any action concerning him.

It certainly cannot be said that there is no possibility of the undercover agent being "made," but this is not necessarily to say that his association with the Bureau must become known. If his notoriety reached the point where his value was materially decreased or where the security forces at Oak Ridge became sufficiently interested in him to force some action concerning his activities, the undercover agent could easily assume some logical explanation as to why he can no longer remain at Oak Ridge, could resign his position and ostensibly return to his home or some other better position. This would in all probability remove any interest on the part of the Commission or security representatives at Oak Ridge and the matter could be dropped. It is not felt that such a situation would arise in less than one year to eighteen months period of time and possibly never until the undercover agent had accomplished his mission.

Although unlikely, it would perhaps be a smart move for a subversive agent at the Ridge who contemplated approaching the Bureau undercover agent to make note of the activities of the undercover agent which were of suspicious security nature, to report such facts to AEC Security himself in order to observe what action they would take against this individual. This would place the subversive agent in the position of confidence with the Security Division and tend to convince them of his own loyalty, while at the same time allowing him an opportunity to see whether sufficient derogatory information could be developed concerning the undercover agent to cause his dismissal or expose should the subversive agent recruit him. The reaction of the undercover agent to any action which might be taken by AEC Security would also be of value to the subversive agent as a method of evaluating the level-headedness and sincerity of the person he contemplated recruiting. Such a planned activity on the part of a subversive agent would obviously create an extremely touchy situation.

Should it develop that a subversive agent did contact and recruit the Bureau Agent, additional problems would present themselves. Information of a classified nature requested or passed to the subversive agent would have to

be cleared with responsible officials of the AEC who could evaluate the importance of the material to the national defense and security. Inquiries in this regard to any magnitude would immediately cause the AEC to conclude that a double agent was being used. The nature of the information in most instances would confine the source to a rather limited group of persons. At this point the AEC would be faced with the decision of either placing complete confidence in the Bureau's coverage or materially tightening the security around that particular group of individuals. In the latter case the possibility of a leak concerning the investigation is greatly enhanced.

In previously-mentioned Bureau letter to El Paso dated March 11, 1949, it is stated that arrangements could likewise be effected with the Commission to make available certain classified and restricted data for release to the informant to pass on to the Soviets, through the medium of the Communist Party. From this statement it is being assumed by this office that the matter has been discussed with proper officials of the AEC. This is mentioned due to the question which has arisen during consideration of this problem as to what the reaction of the Commission will be when and if, by virtue of prosecutive action against a subversive agent or other expedient step, it becomes necessary to make it known that an undercover agent has been used. How would the Commission react to the deluge of protests which they would receive from such organizations as have in the past bitterly complained about the loyalty hearings and the necessity for investigation?

Many things must also be considered concerning the background, education and qualifications of the Bureau Agent to be given this undercover assignment. No matter in which position he might be placed at Oak Ridge, he will, by virtue of conferences, consultation, meetings, joint research of new scientific problems, social gatherings, club or organization affiliation or any other innumerable ways, be associated with scientific personnel from all phases of the atomic energy work at Oak Ridge from time to time. Accordingly, if he is to use an assumed identity he constantly runs the risk of coming into contact with an individual or individuals who may have attended the university or other training institution or previous place of employment where the undercover agent claims he was also engaged, and these persons whom he contacts will know, by virtue of their own attendance at this employment or these classes, that the agent was not present or in attendance. His association with these persons will result in discussions of their professors and theories and their teachings at the various universities and this will necessitate the undercover agent having knowledge concerning the professors, courses, theories, etc taught at the institution where he is supposed to have attended. As the scientific

personnel at Oak Ridge represent a great majority of the better universities and technical institutions in the United States, as well as a large percentage of the electrical and chemical research organizations in the United States, it would be difficult to find one wherein some person presently employed at Oak Ridge was not well acquainted with the personnel, faculty, etc of that institution. Therefore, an assumed identity would be most difficult to maintain.

If the Agent to be given the undercover assignment could use his true identity and give a true personal history in so far as education and employment are concerned, it would be far better from the standpoint of security and all-round acceptability to the other employees at Oak Ridge. It would be much simpler to cover the period of time in which the person was employed by the Bureau, if this were not too lengthy, than it would be to manufacture personal history data.

The ideal situation for scientific personnel would, of course, be to have Agent personnel begin by having received the necessary graduate schooling and to proceed from there through specialization in nuclear chemistry or nuclear physics and on to Oak Ridge or other AEC installation and to work up into the desired capacity. This, of course, is much too long-ranged a policy to be feasible. Perhaps it would be feasible to obtain employees having Masters or Doctors degrees in one of the sciences, who could obtain lesser employment in the atomic energy program and advance rapidly. Another possibility which has some merit is to recruit as Agent personnel former employees of the AEC and the Manhattan Engineering District who are no longer with these organizations but have returned to complete their schooling at some university or are presently engaged in other activity. Of course the danger always exists that such person recruited will refuse to take such position despite the most careful investigation and determination of his attitude and such refusal would immediately pose the possibility that the Bureau's attempt to place informants or undercover agents within the AEC might become known. Also, if maximum security is to be attained in the placement of this individual, no outside individual should be utilized in gaining his employment but such persons should make application for employment with the AEC in the usual procedure and attempt to gain the employment without benefit of assistance from any insider. In such way the undercover agent would be strictly on his own and all information developed concerning him would come directly from the Bureau. Also, the Commission would have no individual readily at hand of whom they could make inquiry at such time as the activity of the undercover agent came to their attention. This, of course, presents the regrettable disadvantage of not being able to place the agent in the most favorable spot, as well as not even being able to assure his acceptance.

While this office feels that there is no way yet conceived which would be foolproof, it does feel that the value of such an individual at Oak Ridge or any atomic energy installation would be of sufficient value to warrant the inescapable and calculated amount of risk. In fact, it might be stated that the amount of risk would vary directly with the value of the undercover agent. The more valuable he becomes to the Bureau the more probable that his activities will warrant the notice of AEC. Many things must be considered in the placement, conduct and continuous activity of an undercover agent in such assignment which are difficult to approach from a point of general discussion by letter. Perhaps if furnished with the type of background which a potential Agent would have, a comprehensive plan could be developed by this office as to the best method to proceed with an accompanying analysis and opinion as to the element of risk involved. It would also be of material assistance if more information could be furnished this office by the Bureau with regard to the manner in which the undercover agent is to set himself up as bait or otherwise place himself in a position where he may establish leaks of restricted information or material. It is felt by this office that the great majority of information developed by this informant which would be of any value will be obtained by him by virtue of his activities outside of work and not through information received by him in the course of his employment. Therefore, it is difficult to enumerate all of the possibilities which exist without more definite information as to the person to be used and the primary objective of his assignment.

b7D Per FBI

It is believed that both [redacted] are thoroughly reliable and could assist in the placement of the undercover agent. However, it is the opinion here that only [redacted] is sufficiently reliable to use in such undertaking as this. It is felt that he would sacrifice his own position and well being if it were necessary to do so in the interest of the protection of the United States. He is strongly in favor of every possible security measure and has repeatedly expressed the desire to assist the Bureau in every way possible. One possible danger lies in the fact that he is one of those persons who is periodically subjected to a polygraph examination. This should not present any problem unless the examiner chanced upon a line of questioning which closely paralleled the informant's participation in this activity, thereby causing a reaction.

One other fact which should be considered is the familiarity of AEC personnel, particularly in the Security Division, with the agent personnel of the Knoxville Office. Therefore, consideration should be given to some arrangement whereby it would not be necessary for Agents of this office ever to contact the undercover agent directly, but rather through some intermediary means or under only the most clandestine arrangement.

In summation, it is the belief of this office that Agents could be placed in undercover assignments within the AEC installations, that their efforts would be productive, and that this could be done with little risk of their position with the Bureau becoming known even though their questionable activity may come to the attention of persons outside of the Bureau.

Any further questions by the Bureau will be answered as completely and logically as is possible.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

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DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: January 30, 1950

FROM : SAC, Albuquerque

SUBJECT: UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION - PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated January 12, 1950, requesting that I furnish my recommendations relative to placing Bureau Agents in Atomic Energy installations in undercover capacity.

The Bureau requested my recommendations relative to the advisability of approaching an appropriate official in the University of California at Los Alamos regarding the placing of a Bureau Agent in the Atomic Energy installation.

The Bureau is advised that I have withheld my recommendations until I had an opportunity to visit Los Alamos and talk to the officials at that installation and I am now of the opinion that the approaching of these officials relative to placing an agent in an undercover capacity would not be well received. Also, such an approach may get back to a Senate Investigating Committee and if so, probably there would be some public inquiries which would be embarrassing to the Bureau.

It is suggested that the Bureau consider the following procedure in getting an informant into the Atomic Energy installation at Los Alamos:

We can contact [redacted] who is the [redacted] and inform him that it is our desire to get a man a job and set forth the man's qualifications and that the individual is in need of a job and we will vouch for his loyalty and integrity. It is believed that [redacted] will go along with this proposition, but if he was approached relative to the securing of an undercover job for an Agent, he would have ever present in his mind that the Bureau had a stool pigeon in the midst of that organization. In the case of my suggestion, the employee would be forgotten and, of course, would be much more valuable.

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It is to be pointed out also that a former FBI Agent is presently [redacted] personnel [redacted] which was formerly operated by the University of California, but has just recently been released to the Sandia Corporation, a subsidiary of Western Electric, Sandia Base activities and Los Alamos activities are one and the same, and it is growing daily in importance relative to their projects. It is felt that an undercover man could be sent in to the Sandia Base installation through this former FBI Agent with not much difficulty and in turn if the Bureau sees fit, could probably be transferred to Los Alamos facilities in due course.

according as determined by CW Rates 2/7/50

pw:ush

RECORDED - 66

66-16371-32

EX-115

61 MAR 22 1950

139

Let to the Director 1-30-50

Re - Undercover Assignments
Atomic Energy Commission

If the Bureau is receptive to the above suggestions, please furnish this office with the scientific qualifications of the Agent who will be selected for this assignment so that we can lay some groundwork in connection with our contacts at these facilities.

No further action is being taken in this matter until advised by the Bureau.

Federal Bureau of Inv

United States Department of Justice
Seattle 4, Washington
February 1, 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIRECTOR, FBI

RE: UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Dear Sir:

ReBulet 1-26-50 bearing the above caption.

I do not believe that a G. E. official at Richland could be approached on this proposition with success. G. E. at Richland is a big organization, but is like all Government Bureaus requiring many copies of all communications, with the resultant red tape, etc. Any contact of a General Electric official at Hanford would result in communication to G. E. Headquarters in Schenectady, with the resultant stenographers, clerks and others knowing the contents of the communication.

I feel the only way the proposition could be fully resolved would be by seeing the President of the General Electric Company. He is the only man I can think of who would not have to write a memorandum for the file. By any other procedure I think we would only be kidding ourselves that our man was under cover. I would recommend that some steps be taken to have the employment begin at Schenectady and then have the man transferred to Richland.

Very truly yours,

J. B. Wilcox

J. B. WILCOX
SAC

JBW:LM

AIR MAIL - SPECIAL DELIVERY

-33

COM-4a

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DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

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F.B.I. TELETYPE

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FBI, ALBUQUERQUE 1 2-3-50 1-19 PM MST EB 1742

DIRECTOR, FBI

URGENT

UNDER COVER ASSIGNMENTS - AEC. RE BUREAU TEL TODAY. LETTER FROM THIS OFFICE FORWARDED TO BUREAU JANUARY THIRTY LAST CAPTIONED AS ABOVE SETTING FORTH COMPLETE INFORMATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

WYLY RECORDED - 50 66-12-71-34
3-20 PM OK FBI WA OVM
RECEIVED 2-3-50 4:03 P.M. TED

cc Mr Bartlett

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's coding systems.

COM-4a

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DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

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FBI, SEATTLE 2-3-50 2-50 PM PST MJC

DIRECTOR, FBI URGENT

UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENT, AEC. REBULET JANUARY 26 LAST AND BUTEL TODAY. RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED FEBRUARY 1.

RECORDED - 80 66-16371-35

5-52 PM OK FBI WA OVM

RECEIVED 2-3-50 6:10 P.M. LL

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's coding systems.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

SAC, Albuquerque

June 11, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNDERCOVER ASSISTANTS
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

RECORDED - 22 66-[illegible] 36

EX-35

Reurlet May 29, 1951, requesting that the Bureau consider the possibility of placing an undercover agent at DP West Site in connection with the investigation of the case entitled "Unknown Subject; Approximately 100 Grams of Plutonium Missing in DP West Site, Los Alamos Atomic Energy Project, AEA, TEP."

The matters referred to in your communication have been given careful consideration and study. It appears that the problems and difficulties involved in attempting to place an Agent in an undercover capacity would outweigh any possible advantages which might result from such an operation. Accordingly, it is not believed desirable to attempt to place an undercover agent at DP West Site in connection with the investigation of the missing plutonium at this time.

You are requested to immediately intensify your efforts to develop confidential plant informants particularly at the DP West Site in an effort to obtain information regarding the missing plutonium. In the event information comes to your attention in the future indicating the desirability of utilizing an agent in an undercover capacity, you should advise the Bureau in order that further consideration may be given in this matter.

KWD:hmb:mh

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Tele. Room
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Gandy

MAILED
JUN 12 1951
COMM - FBI

JUN 26 10 03 AM '51
F. B. I.
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

JUN 12 5 37 PM '51
RECEIVED - DIRECTOR
F. B. I.
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

JUN 12 4 59 PM '51
RECEIVED READING ROOM
F. B. I.
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

JUN 6 4 46 PM '51
RECEIVED READING ROOM
F. B. I.
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

JUN 12 5 21 PM '51
RECEIVED - DIRECTOR
F. B. I.
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 5/29/51

FROM : SAC, ALBUQUERQUE

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

ReBulet to Albuquerque dated 1/12/50, captioned as above, which advised that consideration was being given to placing Bureau Agents in Atomic Energy Installations in undercover capacity. The recommendations of this office was requested at that time as to the advisability of approaching an appropriate official of the University of California at Los Alamos regarding this matter. The Bureau was advised at that time that it was believed that the placing of an undercover agent at Los Alamos would not be well received by laboratory officials.

Reference is made to the pending investigation captioned: "UNKNOWN SUBJECT; Approximately 100 Grams of Plutonium Missing In DP West Site, Los Alamos Atomic Energy Project, AEA, TGP," Bufile 117-1040. An extensive investigation has been conducted in this case but has failed to explain the loss or theft of approximately 100 grams of plutonium. There appears to be a strong possibility that this plutonium may have been removed from the plant by an unauthorized person, as no other explanation has been developed to date.

It is now believed that in view of the missing plutonium case, the officials of the University of California would cooperate with the Bureau in placing an undercover agent at DP West Site in connection with the investigation of this case.

[redacted] b7D has expressed great concern over the fact that there is a possibility that one of the present employees at DP West Site may have taken the missing 100 grams of plutonium. [redacted] has been most cooperative with Bureau Agents in the investigation of this case and other cases and has expressed the desire to render any assistance possible in the future.

The possibility of placing an undercover agent at DP West Site in connection with this investigation was discussed off the record with [redacted] in order that the Bureau could be advised in some detail as to how this might be accomplished. [redacted] readily offered his cooperation to accomplish this purpose.

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AQ 66-162A
UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS
AEC

[redacted] stated that two chemical operators have recently tendered their resignations and the third, [redacted] has declared his intention to resign. These men had no previous special chemical training, and possess only a high school education. [redacted] stated, however, that he wanted to replace these men with individuals having college degrees in order that they might in the future possibly be used in the research and development program at DP West Site. He pointed out that it would not be unusual to hire new men in view of these resignations. He stated that at the present time, he had no one in view for these vacancies and that it would probably be about three or four months before these men could be replaced because it takes that length of time for them to obtain AEC clearance.

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[redacted] stated that ordinarily he had no contact with a prospective employee of his group until after this person had filed an application with the University of California Personnel Office and the application was referred to him by the Personnel Office. He also pointed out that he usually reviewed the application with [redacted] in his group, before recommending to the personnel office that a certain individual be hired. He stated that it would probably create some suspicion if he recommended that a person be hired without discussing their qualifications with either [redacted] He stated, however, that if an application was received from a person with a good chemical background, he believed that such an individual could be hired without causing any suspicion from the [redacted]

[redacted] stated that he believed that the easiest way to get an undercover Bureau Agent into DP West Site would be under an Army cover. He pointed out that there are a number of members of the U. S. Army presently stationed at Los Alamos working in various groups. He pointed out that [redacted] He stated that these men wear civilian clothes and have been very well accepted by other members of the group. He pointed out by having the undercover Agent come in as an Army man, there would be no question concerning his qualifications for the job, pay scale, annual leave, or security clearance. These men are sent to Los Alamos for the benefit of the military services but perform work identical to that done by Laboratory employees. Such a person could go to work at Los Alamos almost immediately with the explanation that he had been granted an AEC clearance in connection with other military service.

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UNDER COVER ASSIGNMENTS
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It is suggested that the Bureau might have an Agent with former service with the Armed Forces who has a chemical background. It is pointed out, however, that an Agent without any training in chemistry might be assigned to DP West Site as a member of the Armed Forces and work as a chemical operator.

In addition to [redacted] it would be necessary to discuss this matter with [redacted] Division, and [redacted]

No information is presently available at Los Alamos, New Mexico, concerning the technical training of [redacted] DP West Site, as the AEC Security Files were only sent to Los Alamos for review and have been returned to the AEC Office in Washington, D. C.

It is believed that it would be highly desirable to select an Agent with a scientific background for an undercover assignment at Los Alamos. Such an Agent, through his contact with other scientists and possibly through membership in scientific organizations at Los Alamos, might be of great value to the Bureau in the field of general intelligence matters. Also, through the experience gained in this matter, the Bureau might be able to determine whether it would be advisable to place undercover agents in other Atomic Energy Installations.

It is requested that the Bureau consider the contacting of appropriate officials of the Department of the Defense concerning the possibility of placing an undercover Bureau Agent under cover of being a member of one of the Armed Services. If the Bureau does not consider that this is advisable, it is suggested that consideration be given to trying to have an Agent hired under cover as a civilian employee of the University of California at Los Alamos. If an Agent can be designated with the proper background, it is believed that arrangements can be made at Los Alamos with LASL officials to have this Agent employed at the DP West Site. It is believed that the only officials who would have to know this Agent's identity would be [redacted]

It is pointed out, however, that the University of California in most cases checks directly on a prospective employee's education and former experience.

AO 65-162A
UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS
AEC

If an undercover Agent is to be hired as a civilian employee, it might also be necessary to discuss this matter with Mr. JOHN B. YOUND, Director of the Personnel Division, University of California.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. LADD

DATE: June 12, 1951

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

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PURPOSE:

To advise in connection with questions raised by the Director that approval for the discontinuance of the Undercover Assignments Program was obtained in February, 1950. The program of developing confidential plant informants among AEC employees has been kept constantly vitalized and is closely supervised. It is not believed that an undercover agent would be helpful in solving the missing plutonium case.

DETAILS:

Reference is made to the attached memorandum from Mr. Hennrich to Mr. Belmont dated June 5, 1951. The Director raised the following questions in connection with the above matter:

1. Re Discontinuing Using Men at AEC Installations

In a memorandum dated February 28, 1950, entitled "Undercover Assignments," it was recommended that the program of placing Agents in AEC installations not be pursued further on advice from SAC's that the program would be extremely hazardous and explosive. This recommendation was approved by the Director. (66-16371-27)

2. Re Responsibility for Informant Coverage

The Bureau has assumed the responsibility of developing confidential plant informants among employees at AEC installations. At certain Class A installations like Los Alamos, confidential plant informants are developed in connection with every phase of operations, and cards are maintained at the Bureau on the informants developed. The program of developing informants among employees at AEC installations is kept constantly vitalized and is closely supervised in order to insure complete coverage.

3. Re Value of Undercover Agent in Solving Case

The possibility of an undercover agent developing information which would aid in solving the case involving the loss of plutonium would be slight since it is not known whether or not a theft has actually occurred. It is believed that efforts to develop additional confidential plant informants would be more productive in developing information in this case.

K.D:mes

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RECORDED - 78

166-16371-37

JUN 19 1950

52 JUL 20 1951

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 5, 1951

FROM : C. E. Hennrich

SUBJECT: UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

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117-1040

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Purpose:

To advise that the Albuquerque Office has requested the Bureau to consider placing an undercover agent at DP West Site, Los Alamos, in connection with the investigation of the case involving the missing 100 grams of plutonium. Previous efforts to place undercover agents at AEC installations were discontinued in view of the opinion of the field offices involved that such an operation would be extremely hazardous and explosive. The possible value of an undercover agent in solving the plutonium case appears to be outweighed by difficulties and problems involved in such an operation. It is recommended that Albuquerque be so advised.

Details:

The Albuquerque Office in a letter dated May 29, 1951, requested that the Bureau consider placing an undercover agent at DP West Site, Los Alamos, in connection with the investigation being conducted under the caption "Unknown Subject; Approximately 100 Grams of Plutonium Missing in DP West Site, Los Alamos Atomic Energy Project, AEA, TGP." The Albuquerque Office advised that [redacted] Los Alamos, in an off-the-record discussion had offered his cooperation in the event the Bureau desired to place an undercover agent at the DP West Site. [redacted] advised that recently two chemical operators had resigned and that he believed if an application were received from a person with a good chemical background that such an individual could be hired without causing any suspicion. [redacted] suggested that the easiest way to place an undercover agent in DP West Site would be through the use of an Army cover. He stated that Army men performed work identical to that done by laboratory employees and could be put to work immediately without explanation that previous clearance had been granted in connection with other military service.

Attachment
KWD:hmb:mh

RECORDED - 78
EX-60

JUN 19 1951

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52 JUL 20 1951

HANDLED BY STOP DESK

Albuquerque requested that the Bureau consider contacting appropriate officials of the Department of Defense concerning the possibility of placing an undercover agent as a member of one of the Armed Services. The Bureau was requested to consider placing an agent in an undercover capacity as a civilian employee of the University of California at Los Alamos in the event the Bureau does not desire to use the Army cover.

Previous Consideration of Undercover Assignments at AEC Installations:

Reference is made to the memorandum dated February 28, 1950, from Mr. Keay to Mr. Belmont. The above memorandum reflects that Special Agents Richard A. Frye, Armand A. Cammarota and [redacted] were selected because of their scientific backgrounds for possible undercover examination at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos and Hanford, AEC installations. Suitable covers were arranged and application forms for employment at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos and Hanford were made without knowledge of AEC officials or company officials that they were Special Agents. In each instance, the agent was advised that no position was open. The above memorandum pointed out that in the opinion of the Special Agents in Charge of the Albuquerque, Knoxville and Seattle offices any attempt to place agents in an undercover capacity at AEC installations would be extremely hazardous and explosive. On the basis of the opinion of the above SAC's, it was recommended that the matter not be pursued further at that time. This recommendation was approved by the Director.

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Observations Re Manner of Placing Undercover Agent:

1. It appears that the placing of an undercover agent as a member of the Armed Services would be involved and would increase the possibility of the Agent's position being compromised.

2. Field offices covering AEC installations have in the past expressed the opinion that the most desirable method of placing undercover agents is through the use of top officials of the operating companies.

Investigative Techniques Now Being Utilized:

1. Extensive investigation has been conducted in the case involving the lost plutonium at Los Alamos. Interviews were conducted with hundreds of employees and all important suspects were subjected to a polygraph test.

2. Confidential plant informants have been developed at the Los Alamos installation as in other Atomic Energy installations for the purpose of developing information in connection with Bureau cases.

3. Certain selected agents have attended special training courses given by AEC regarding the Accountability System and methods utilized at AEC installations. These agents are located in offices covering the major AEC installations and are utilized in the investigation of cases involving the loss of materials.

Bureau Responsibility for Informant Coverage at AEC Installations:

1. The Bureau has assumed the responsibility of developing confidential plant informants among employees at AEC installations. At Class A installations like Los Alamos, confidential plant informants are developed in connection with every phase of operations and cards are maintained at the Bureau on the informants developed. The program of developing informants among employees at AEC installations is kept constantly vitalized and is closely supervised in order that the Bureau will have complete coverage.

2. As previously noted, consideration has been given to the placing of undercover agents at AEC installations in addition to the general plant informant coverage. This program has not been pursued based on the previous recommendations of SAC's as it would be extremely hazardous and explosive.

Observations Re Possible Value of Undercover Agent in Solving Plutonium Case:

1. To date, the investigation in the plutonium case had failed to clearly establish that a theft rather than a paper shortage is involved. An undercover agent would be of no value if only a paper shortage is involved.

2. An undercover agent would require a considerable length of time to make contacts and become familiar with the activities of possible suspects. Whether information of value would result from an undercover agent operation would depend a great deal on the ability of the agent selected; however, it is not believed that such an operation would be very productive in view of the lapse of time since the loss occurred, changes in personnel and other factors involved.

3. In connection with No. 2 above, it is noted that one of the principal suspects, [redacted] has declared his intention to resign. In addition, two other chemical operators at DP West Site had recently turned in their resignations. b6 b7C

Advantages of an Undercover Operation:

1. Albuquerque pointed out that in the event an undercover agent is utilized that experience might be gained which would enable the Bureau to determine the advisability of reactivating the program of placing undercover agents in AEC installations.

2. The advantages of having an agent undercover making contacts among scientists who are known to be prime targets of Soviet espionage are apparent.

Disadvantages:

1. As has been pointed out by SAC's familiar with AEC installations the placing of an undercover agent would be extremely hazardous and explosive.

2. In the event the Special Agents previously selected for this type of assignment were used, AEC officials and AEC contractors may become aware of the Bureau's previous attempt to place these individuals in an undercover capacity resulting in embarrassment to the Bureau.

3. An undercover agent would require a considerable period of time to make contacts and acquaint himself with the conditions.

4. A public disclosure of such a program might result in outcries of Gestapo tactics from certain sources.

Summary:

The possibility of an undercover agent developing information which would aid in solving the loss of plutonium would be slight since it is not even known whether or not a theft has actually occurred. It is believed that efforts to develop additional confidential plant informants would be more productive in developing information in this case.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Albuquerque Office be advised that it is not believed desirable to attempt to place an undercover agent at DP West Site in connection with the missing plutonium at this time. If you approve, there is attached a letter to the Albuquerque Office in accordance with the above.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

DATE: July 31, 1952

Tolson
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

PURPOSE:

To recommend that this file be retained in Confidential Room 6527.

DETAILS:

This file pertains to the Bureau's efforts in placing Bureau Agents in an undercover capacity at atomic energy installations.

Reason for Retaining in Confidential Room:

Since this file relates to the highly confidential technique to be utilized in placing Bureau Agents in an undercover capacity, it should not be available on an unrestricted basis.

Security Measures to be Observed:

This file should be made available by the Unit Supervisor in Room 6523 at the request of Supervisors who require this file in connection with their work.

Dissemination:

In view of the nature of this file, there should be no dissemination of the information outside of the Bureau. Letters to the field in connection with this file should be directed to the SAC, Personal and Confidential.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this file be retained in Confidential Room 6527 and that this memorandum be cross referenced and placed on the outside cover of the file as a guide in connection with the handling of the file.

KWD:mes
66-16371

EX-141

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66-16371-39

AUG 5 1952

17

57 AUG 18 1952

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SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET

cc - Mr. Ladd
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan

RECORDED - 16
EX - 118

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August 25, 1953

VIA LIAISON

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 02-07-2011 BY 60322/UCLRP/PJ/EHL

Honorable Lewis L. Strauss
Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission
19th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Admiral:

I wish to acknowledge the receipt of your letter forwarded on August 20, 1953, via liaison channels, in which you request our consideration of the assignment of Agents in an undercover capacity at the more sensitive Atomic Energy Commission Projects.

We have carefully considered the program referred to in your letter and have instructed our Liaison Agent, Charles A. Bates, to discuss this matter with you.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

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FBD:eme

SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET

32 SEP 17 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

cc - Mr. Branigan

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: August 25, 1953

FROM : A. H. Belmont

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DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHL

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SUBJECT: UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Mr. Strauss, Chairman, AEC, in a letter received via liaison August 20, 1953, requested reconsideration of assignment of Agents in undercover capacity within sensitive AEC projects in view of recent reports indicating Soviet sources in the atomic energy program. In April, 1949, Executive Conference and the Director approved a plan for placing Agents in an undercover capacity at three AEC installations. In a memorandum dated February 28, 1950, it was recommended that the program not be pursued further based on the advice of SAC's that the program would be extremely hazardous and explosive. This recommendation was approved by the Director. The following programs are presently being utilized to carry out our responsibilities under the atomic energy program:

1) Confidential plant informants.
2) National Defense Key Facility List Program.
3) Contacting scientists on a selected basis.
4) Double Agent Program.

An undercover operation would appear to have the following advantages:

1) Increased security coverage.
2) Aid in investigation of violations.
3) Possibly aid in the uncovering of leaks of information.

It should be noted that the possible advantages listed above would apply on a highly limited basis. AEC's security set-up is compartmentalized and any activity of an undercover agent outside of a small section of a plant would arouse suspicion. Even though a large number of Agents were used their efforts would be ineffective from an over-all coverage standpoint in view of the many sections and divisions existing in the 517 AEC plants throughout the United States.

66-16371
Attachment
KWD:eme

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EX - 118

66-16371-41

SEP 14 1953

62 SEP 17 1953

ESP/SEG

Some important projects within a plant may be composed of only one or two individuals who work entirely apart and separate from the rest of the plant. Other sections may be composed of numerous scientists working on a different phase of research. Three thousand eight hundred and forty-six (3,846) plant informants have been developed and numerous others are being developed as new plants are built. This indicates the difficulty that would be encountered in obtaining adequate coverage by undercover assignments.

The program would have the following disadvantages:

1) Require considerable period before productive.
2) Extremely hazardous and explosive operation.
3) Require considerable personnel in view of expansion of AEC.
4) Public disclosure might result in embarrassment.

In addition to the disadvantages it is noted that we were unable to obtain cooperation from the Atomic Energy Commission when the undercover operation was first proposed. We have also encountered a lack of cooperation with regard to the reporting of violations, a number of which were brought to Mr. Strauss' attention in a letter dated July 27, 1953. Recommendations proposed for the improvement of AEC security in connection with the investigation involving the document lost by Professor Wheeler have not as yet been adopted. The lack of central security control in AEC's organizational setup could create numerous problems and difficulties if an undercover assignment program were adopted.

Instead of adopting an undercover program, AEC can better achieve security by adopting central security control to back up a hard-hitting inspection force which will insure compliance of regulations and prompt reporting of violations.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) In view of the disadvantages to such a program, it appears that continued intensification of our coverage of Soviet and satellite officials; continued emphasis on security investigations; continued informant coverage; and double agent program are more practical, economical, and effective than the initiation of an undercover program at this time.

sent 8-25-53

2) That the attached letter be delivered to Mr. Strauss. At the same time our Liaison Agent should brief Strauss on the Bureau's position in accordance with the above.

1. Letter is OK.
2. I think our reasons for not doing it should be:
   1. Our personnel & funds will not permit it. Point out $2,283,000. have just been impounded in our current funds & $5,849,000. has been cut from our funds for next fiscal year. These cuts will compel us to curtail our present coverage & most certainly we can't think of expanding it.
   2. Lack of cooperation of A & C
   3. No central control in A & C.
   4. No adequate inspection system in A & C.

The last 3 are only collateral.

DETAILS:

Mr. Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, in an undated letter received via liaison August 20, 1953, requested our reconsideration of the possibility of assigning Agents to duty within sensitive AEC projects under appropriate covert conditions in view of recent reports indicating Soviet sources in the atomic energy program.

BACKGROUND:

On April 11, 1949, the Executive Conference unanimously recommended the undercover assignment of three Agents to three atomic energy installations. This was approved by the Director.
(Conference memorandum, April 13, 1949; 66-16371-2)

In a memorandum dated July 18, 1949, Inspector V. P. Keay advised that Lewis Strauss was contacted concerning this matter and was very much in favor of the program. (66-16371-4)

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In a memorandum dated February 28, 1950, Inspector Keay reported that Special Agents Richard A. Frye, Armand A. Cammorata, and [redacted] *had been selected for possible undercover assignment at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, and Hanford Atomic Energy Commission Projects. Suitable covers were arranged and application forms for employment were completed and forwarded to AEC officials at the respective installations. Each of the three Agents was advised that no position was open. Mr. Strauss was recontacted and informed of the difficulty experienced in obtaining AEC employment for the Agents. Mr. Strauss stated that the only course open was to contact highly reliable and important officials of the companies involved and obtain employment for the Agents through this method. (66-16371-17x1)*

The SAC's of offices covering major AEC projects were requested to furnish their recommendations and suggestions regarding the placing of undercover Agents through officials of AEC contractors. In reply, the Special Agents in Charge advised that any attempt to place Agents in an undercover capacity through company officials would be extremely hazardous and explosive. In view of the opinion of the SAC's the fact that Mr. Strauss did not at that time desire to actively assist in placing the Agents and, in fact, was leaving the Commission on April 15, 1950, it was recommended that the matter not be pursued further at that time. The above recommendation was approved by the Director. (Memorandum of February 28, 1950; 66-16371-27)

Bureau Responsibility for Security of AEC Installations:

The FBI, in addition to having exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the Atomic Energy Act, has the general responsibility of investigating security matters involving AEC installations and the dissemination of pertinent information to the Atomic Energy Commission and interested agencies. The AEC has the responsibility for safeguarding facilities, equipment, materials, and property, and to control the dissemination of restricted data. In order to carry out its responsibilities the Bureau maintains the following programs:

1) Development of Confidential Plant Informants at AEC Installations - At the more important installations, plant informants have been developed in connection with every phase of operations and individual informant cards are maintained at the Bureau for the purpose of insuring that adequate coverage is obtained at each plant. This program is kept constantly vitalized and is closely supervised. As of June 20, 1953, 3,846 confidential plant informants had been developed in 517 atomic energy plants.

2) National Defense Key Facility List Program - Confidential plant informants are developed in key facilities including those pertaining to the atomic energy program. In addition, semiannual contacts are made with law enforcement agencies and informants in the vicinity of these facilities to insure that information relating to the security of the installation is brought promptly to our attention.

3) A program was initiated in April, 1949, in which scientists are contacted on a selective basis who, because of their knowledge and work on atomic energy, might be contacted by the Soviets. During this program numerous scientists have been contacted, informed of the Bureau's jurisdiction, and have periodically been contacted as potential informants.

4) Double Agent Program - Intensive efforts have been made to develop double agents in the atomic energy program. Although a number of scientists have been contacted in connection with this program, none of those contacted have as yet reported being contacted by the Communist Party or Soviet espionage agents.

Advantages of an Undercover Operation:

1) Increased security coverage of the atomic energy program.

2) Possible development of information regarding leaks to the Soviets in the atomic energy program.

3) Possible assistance in aiding investigations of violations occurring at AEC plants.

It should be noted that the possible advantages listed above would apply on a highly limited basis. AEC's security setup is compartmentalized and any activity of an undercover agent outside of a small section of a plant would arouse suspicion. Even though a large number of Agents were used their efforts would be ineffective from an over-all coverage standpoint in view of the many sections and divisions existing in the 517 AEC plants throughout the United States. Some important projects within a plant may be composed of only one or two individuals who work entirely apart and separate from the rest of the plant. Other sections may be composed of numerous scientists working on a different phase of research. Three thousand eight hundred and forty-six (3,486) plant informants have been developed and numerous others are being developed as new plants are built. This indicates the difficulty that would be encountered in obtaining adequate coverage by undercover assignments.

Disadvantages:

1) Establishing such an operation is extremely hazardous and explosive.

2) A considerable period of time would be necessary for the undercover agents to make contacts and become acquainted with conditions before any productivity.

3) Under the Atomic Energy Commission security setup, information is to a large extent compartmentalized. In order to obtain adequate coverage it would be necessary to assign a considerable number of Agents. AEC now has major installations and vital research programs throughout the U.S. The three Agents previously considered for such an assignment would be wholly inadequate in view of the tremendous expansion in the atomic energy program.

4) A possible public disclosure of such a program might result in outcries of Gestapo tactics from scientists and other sources.

5) The possibility of an undercover agent program developing information regarding a leak in the atomic energy program would be slight in view of the enormous scope of the program.

IMPROVEMENT IN AEC SECURITY NECESSARY INSTEAD OF UNDERCOVER PROGRAM:

In a number of instances in the past we have experienced a lack of cooperation on the part of the Atomic Energy Commission with regard to the promptness of reporting violations and in adopting recommended procedures to improve security. In a letter to Mr. Strauss dated July 27, 1953, we cited three instances where local AEC Security Offices or contractors had failed to promptly report violations requiring investigation by this Bureau. In connection with the investigation of the case entitled "Loss of Highly Secret Atomic Energy Document by Professor John A. Wheeler, Princeton University, January 7, 1953, Atomic Energy Act," a number of recommendations were proposed for the improvement of AEC security at the request of the Attorney General. It was pointed out to AEC that decentralization of security control appeared to be the organizational weakness from which many of its problems arose. The Atomic Energy Commission has not as yet adopted central security control. The failure of AEC Security Headquarters to control local Security Officers who are responsible to local area managers could create a number of problems and difficulties in effecting an undercover assignment program.

Instead of adopting an undercover program, AEC can better achieve security by adopting central security control to back up a hard-hitting inspection force which will insure compliance of regulations and prompt reporting of violations.

OBSERVATIONS:

1) The Russians have developed the atomic bomb and have now detonated a hydrogen device.

2) Suggested reconsideration of the program at this time appears to be similar to closing the barn door after the cows have escaped.

3) In the light of past experience, we cannot be certain of obtaining complete AEC cooperation which is essential to setting up such a program.

4) It appears that continued intensification of our coverage of Soviet and satellite officials on security cases; continued pressure on the field to increase informant coverage; and the development of double agents and informants among key scientists will be more productive at this time in view of the initial delay in the undercover program.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: September 2, 1953

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

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Reference my memorandum to you of August 25, 1953, pointing out that a letter had been received on August 20, 1953, from Lewis Strauss, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, requesting consideration of assignment of Agents in undercover capacity within sensitive AEC projects. It will be recalled that in April, 1949, the Bureau started such a program but experienced difficulty in obtaining employment for Agents and on the advice of SAC's that the program would be extremely hazardous and explosive, the program was not pursued.

On referenced memorandum the Director stated, "I think our reasons for not doing it should be: 1. Our personnel and funds will not permit it. Point out $2,283,000 have just been impounded in our current funds and $5,849,000 has been cut from our funds for next fiscal year. These cuts will compel us to curtail our present coverage and most certainly we can't think of extending it. 2. Lack of cooperation of AEC. 3. No central control in AEC. 4. No adequate inspection system in AEC. The last three are only collateral. H"

Upon Mr. Strauss' return to the city on the morning of September 2, 1953, he was contacted by Liaison Agent Bates. Strauss was advised that our personnel and funds would not permit such a program. He was informed that $2,283,000 had been impounded in our current funds and that $5,849,000 has been cut from our funds for the next fiscal year. He was informed that these cuts would compel the Bureau to curtail our present coverage and would certainly mean that we could not think of extending it. Strauss was further informed that collaterally, the lack of cooperation by the AEC in reporting violations immediately to the Bureau; the lack of centralized control in AEC; and the absence of an adequate inspection system were factors which the Bureau considered.

Mr. Strauss stated that the Director was perfectly correct in all of his comments and that he wanted the Director to know that centralized control of security and a strong inspection system would definitely be accomplished; however, since the General Manager (Marion Boyer) of the AEC is being replaced within 60 days, these programs have been held up for this reason. Strauss stated that he hoped to take this matter up with the Director again after his reorganization of the Division of Security. Strauss commented that whether justifiably or not, he enjoyed excellent relations with many Members of Congress and

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that if the Director felt it advisable, Strauss might contact some of these people on the premise that in order to make the AEC security program more effective, he had certain programs in mind which would incidentally, if put into effect, require additional appropriation for the FBI.

Strauss stated he appreciated the Director's careful consideration of this program and wanted him to know that he was always ready to be of assistance to the Bureau at any time.

ACTION:

None. This is submitted for your information.

4-650 (Rev. 10-17-62)
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-02-2011 BY 60322 UCLRP/PJ/EHLn

Belmont
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Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 9-30-64

FROM : W. S. Tavel

SUBJECT: UNDERCOVER ASSIGNMENTS
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Bufile 66-16371

The above captioned file is presently maintained in the Special File Room of the Records Branch, Files and Communications Division. You are requested to have the substantive supervisor, responsible for this matter, review the file to determine if it is necessary to continue to maintain the file in the Special File Room, or whether it may be returned to the regular file sequence. The appropriate notation should be made on this memorandum which should be returned to the Filing Unit, Room 1113 IB. This memorandum will be filed in the case file to record the action taken in connection with this review.

LWB:snw
(2)

66-16371
NOT RECORDED

FEB 9 1965

10/14/64
There appears to be no need to retain this file in SFR.
gjw

FEB 9 1965

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FOIPA
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Page 79 ~ b6, b7C
Page 107 ~ Referral/Consult
Page 131 ~ Referral/Direct

FBI File Number 66-HQ-16371 EBF 14x1, Section 1

September 30, 1949

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b7C

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DATE 09-09-2010 BY 60322 UCLP/PJ/EHL

NAME	EOD	PRES. ASSIGNMENT	BACKGROUND
		School Los Angeles	
Bach, Harmon	4-14-47	Chicago	10 hrs. College Physics; Minor - Chemistry.
		Chicago Pittsburgh New York Cleveland School Washington Field School Seattle Seattle New York Los Angeles New York	
Frye, Richard C.	1-20-47	New York	Major - Chemistry; 2½ yrs. exp. in Inorganic research; Research Chemistry in Ordnance Department, U.S. Army.
		Cleveland Seattle Miami	
Hafley, James B.	6-30-41	Mobile	Major - Chemistry; Qualitative & Quantative Chemical Annaylst for Ga. State Chemist's office, 2 yrs. exp.
		Los Angeles Philadelphia Savannah	
Hunt, Wayne G.	9-27-43	Philadelphia	Minor - Physics; 4 yrs. college physics; Use of radio, radar; 1½ yrs. experience.
		San Francisco San Francisco WFO	

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b7C

NAME	EOD	PRESENT ASSIGNMENT	BACKGROUND
		WFO Los Angeles WFO Newark San Francisco	
McKinnell, Robert L.	10-20-47	Baltimore	Major Mech. Engineering; Minor Aero. Engineering; 1 yr. college physics; 1 yr. Elec. Engineering
		Files New York	
O'Hara, Thomas J., Jr.	7-11-49	Detroit	2 yrs. college physics
		WFO School San Juan School	
Price, James W.	8-18-47	San Francisco	1 yr. college physics
		Butte New York New York Buffalo ~~WFO~~	
Webb, Arthur S.	2-10-41	Louisville	Minor - Chemistry; 1 yr. college physics
		School WFO Seattle	